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JULIAN KU AND JOHN YOO

BEYOND FORMALISM IN

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
TO THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

For almost a quarter century, courts and judges, government officials and law professors have argued over the place of international
law within the American legal system. Today, the "modern position"
accepted by several courts of appeals and many leading international
and foreign relations law scholars maintains that the federal courts
can interpret and enforce customary international law (CIL) as federal common law. Incorporation of CIL as federal law formally
occurs through the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a previously obscure
and largely ignored subsection of the Judiciary Act of 1789, whose
text allows aliens to seek damages for torts in violation of the law
of nations in federal court.' According to its supporters, the ATS
allows the United States to play an important role in the development and enforcement of CIL generally, and human rights law
specifically.2
Julian Ku is Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. John Yoo is
Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), and Visiting
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute.
AUTHORS' NOTE: We would like to thank Brad Clark, Jesse Choper, Bill Dodge, Dan
Farber, Phil Frickey, John Manning, Paul Mishkin, Jide Nzelibe, Peter Spiro, and Michael
Ramsey for their comments on the manuscript. Katherine Graf provided excellent research
assistance. The article benefited from comments received at a conference on international
law at Boalt Hall.
128 USC § 1350.
Two of the ATS's most prominent academic supporters along these lines are Deans
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Critics, however, respond that standard approaches to the federal
common law as well as the Constitution's formal allocation of the
foreign affairs power deprive the courts of any authority to assimilate substantive CIL as federal law.3 Rather, the ATS vested the
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear cases between aliens and,
presumably, American defendants-provided that Congress has also
created a specific cause of action. Thus was launched one of the
sharpest and most bitter debates in recent international legal scholarship, featuring an outpouring of articles even though ATS suits
reaching the courts of appeals have numbered no more than two
dozen. It is fair to say that neither side has convinced the other.
In last Term's Sosa v Alvarez Machain, the Supreme Court waded
into this debate for the first time.4 The decision reflected the stalemate in formalist arguments over the interpretation of the ATS.
Drawing upon the textual and structural insights provided by the
modern position's critics, the Court concluded that the ATS is
merely a jurisdictional statute. Nonetheless, with little explanation,
the Court also refused to stop the lower courts from allowing aliens
to seek damages in federal court for CIL violations. Vhy? We
believe that the Court was reluctant to end federal judicial participation in the development and enforcement of CIL for unstated
functional, policy, or pragmatic reasons, which have also been unexplored in the academic debate.
We use the Court's under-theorized conclusion as an opportunity
to take a different approach. Rather than reexamine the ATS's text,
structure, and history, we conduct a comparative institutional analysis of the role of the courts in foreign affairs. This approach takes
two steps. First, it seeks to define the purpose or social goal of the
ATS. Without a definition of the statute's purpose, we cannot deHarold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter (formerly Burley). See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 Yale L J 2347 (1991); Anne-Marie Burley,
The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am J Intl L 461
(1989).
'The most prominent of the critics have been Professors Curtis Bradley andJack Goldsmith.
See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997).
124 S Ct 2739 (2004). A number of authors have already discussed the Sosa case. See,
for example, Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy
Reveals About the Alien Tort Statute, 80 Notre Dame L Rev 111 (2004); Mark K. Moller,
Old Puzzles, Puzzling Answers: The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 2004 Cato Sup Ct Rev 209 (2004); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 Colum L Rev 1492 (2004); J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 Colum L Rev 1687 (2004).
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termine whether judicial participation is the most effective institutional tool. Second, we compare the institutional capabilities of
the judiciary and the executive in implementing foreign policy in
general, and in applying CIL in particular. Both a macro- and microassessment of the federal courts reveals significant institutional
weaknesses in the implementation of foreign policy and CIL. We
conclude that the executive branch can more effectively achieve the
purpose behind the ATS.
Defenders of the modern position have argued that a jurisdictional approach to the ATS would disrupt American foreign relations by allowing the states, rather than a single federal judiciary,
to make and enforce CIL. Recent changes, recognized by the Supreme Court, in the relationship between the executive branch and
the states in foreign relations address this concern. The Court has
recognized the functional superiority of the President in managing
foreign affairs by permitting presidential declarations of international policy to preempt state law. Thus, CIL could continue as
part of the common law of the states-enforceable in state court
or through diversity jurisdiction in federal court-subject to federal
preemption by the President. Under this system, courts would continue to adjudicate CIL cases, while at the same time allowing a
functionally superior executive branch to oversee and unify the interpretation of CIL when necessary.
Part I discusses the development and widespread embrace of the
modern position on the question of CIL's status as federal law. It
then describes the formalist challenge, which generated several responses built on arguments of statutory and constitutional text and
history. Part II describes Sosa's conflicted nature: its adoption of
the recent critique of the modern position, but also its preservation
of a federal court role in developing and enforcing CIL through
the ATS. This outcome represents an unspoken recognition of the
power of the policy goals behind the modern position.
Part III offers a functional assessment of the statutory purpose
of the ATS and of the institutions best positioned to carry it out.
We define the ATS's policy as one designed to promote the development and enforcement of CIL generally, and human rights
more specifically. We argue that the Sosa Court's reading of the
ATS assumes that Congress has delegated authority in this area to
the courts. Part III concludes that the federal courts have few institutional advantages, and many disadvantages, in the interpretation
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and application of CIL. We contend that the executive branch is
institutionally superior to the courts in achieving national policy
goals in this area.
Conflict between the executive and courts, or disruption in national control over the implementation of CIL, will not occur under
the proposal unveiled in Part IV. We argue that the interpretation
and enforcement of CIL has long been treated as common law
independently interpreted and applied by the state courts. State
control of CIL does not create harmful decentralization of foreign
policy because of federal preemption by the President. Strong functional reasons support a state-led system of CIL development, supervised by the executive branch, over the system endorsed in Sosa.
I
More than two decades of vigorous debate over the ATS
among international and foreign relations law scholars preceded
Sosa. After the Second Circuit's 1980 decision in Filartigav PenaIrala,5 scholars widely hailed the ATS as a vehicle for the incorporation of international law into U.S. domestic law and as an
important mechanism for the development of international law generally. In the last decade, however, critics have raised serious questions about Filartiga'sconsistency with the statute's history, its original meaning, and the Constitution's structure. Because of the ATS's
brevity and the paucity of historical evidence, the academic literature has reached a stalemate.
A.

FILARTIGA AND THE ACADEMY

Filartigawas the first modern decision to enforce CIL in federal
court through the ATS. It held that the ATS granted federal courts
jurisdiction over lawsuits brought by aliens seeking damages for
violations of international human rights law. The Second Circuit
endorsed two principles that would become the subject of substantial academic discussion. First, Filartigaheld that the exercise
of jurisdiction over a lawsuit alleging violations of CIL was consistent with Article III's limitations on federal subject matter jurisdiction. 6 Even though the suit, between two aliens, did not fall
' 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
6
Id at 885.
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under diversity jurisdiction, Filartigaheld that subject matter jurisdiction existed because the case involved "the law of nations,
which has always been part of the federal common law."7 Second,
Filartigaheld that the Constitution did not require Congress to
incorporate the law of nations by statute, despite Congress's power
to "Define and Punish Offences against the Law of Nations. '
"This extravagant claim," Filartigaobserved, "is amply refuted by
the numerous decisions applying rules of international law uncodified in any act of Congress." 9 Although conceding that federal
courts could not "make" new causes of action, Filartiganonetheless
concluded that the federal courts were authorized to enforce rights
widely recognized and accepted as CIL, even where Congress had
not specifically defined such CIL. Such lawsuits could even be
brought against alien defendants for acts that occurred abroad.
Prior to Filartiga,some leading international legal scholars had
advocated the use of domestic courts to incorporate international
law into domestic U.S. law.1" But Filartigagave the idea new life.
Rather than focusing on state practice and international relations,
scholars could point to a growing number of new judicial decisions
that demonstrated both the reality and efficacy of international
law.11 Professor Henkin's article from 1984 was representative:
As a result, there is now general agreement that international
law, as incorporated into domestic law in the United States,
is federal, not state law; that cases arising under international
law are "cases arising under. . . the Laws of the United States"
and therefore are within the judicial power to the United States
under article III of the Constitution; that principles of international law as incorporated in the law of the United States
are "Laws of the United States" and supreme under article VI;
that international law, therefore, is to be determined independently by the federal courts, and ultimately by the United
Id.
'US Const, Art I, § 8.
9

oFilartiga,630 F2d at 886.
"0See, for example, Richard Lillich, The ProperRole of Domestic Courts in the International
Legal Order, 11 Va J Intl L 9 (1970); Richard Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the
InternationalLegal Order (Syracuse, 1964).
" The status of international law as law has been a long-standing preoccupation of
international legal scholars. For a discussion of the international law academy's struggle
with critics of the "lawness" of international law, see Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and InternationalRelations: A Dual Agenda, 87 Am J Intl L 205, 207-20
(1992).
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States Supreme Court, with its determination binding on the
state courts; and that a determination of international law by
a state court is a federal question subject to review by the
Supreme Court.2

On the doctrinal front, Filartigaalso achieved wide acceptance.
The American Law Institute's 1986 Restatement (Third) of U.S.
Foreign Relations Law, which reflected the views of the leading
international law scholars of the day, departed from past views and
endorsed Filartiga.It held that "[c]ustomary international law is
considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is
federal law. A determination of international law by the Supreme
Court is binding on the States and on State courts."' 3 The Restatement (Third) followed Filartiga'sanalysis of the judicial enforceability of CIL in federal courts. It commented that "there is
no reason to treat claims arising under international law any differently from those arising under other federal law."' 4 More explicitly, the Restatement (Third) endorsed Filartiga'sgrant to individuals of a cause of action in federal courts for violations of
international human rights law. 5
As Professor Stephan has observed, these doctrinal shifts
wrought a "revolution in U.S. foreign relations law.

"16

The

adoption of the Restatement meant that,
[t]he construct called customary international law existed not
as a locus of scholarly debate and speculation, but as an independent source of judicial power to pronounce norms and
punish wrongdoers. Any person injured by a violation of customary international law could seek redress against any subject
of international law, foreign or domestic, state or private. Labeling a desired outcome customary international law provided
and ousted prior rules based on comfederal court jurisdiction
7
mon law or statute.'

12 Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 Mich L Rev 1555,
1559-60 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
"3Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111 (1986).
"1Id at § 111 n 4.
" Id at § 703 n 7.
16 Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary InternationalLaw: The Intellectual Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
44 Va J Intl L 33, 47 (2003).
17 Id.
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FILARTIGA'S FORMALIST CRITICS

Filartigawas not accepted without dissent. In 1986, Professor
Philip Trimble wrote an early critique of the idea that CIL constituted federal law, i" and two years later Professor Arthur Weisburd expanded the challenge to the domestic legal status of international law.19 Academic discussion, however, did not flare up
into a full-fledged controversy until the 1997 publication in the
HarvardLaw Review of an article by Professors Curtis Bradley and
Jack Goldsmith criticizing what they called the "modern position"
that CIL enjoyed the status of federal common law.2" These critics
offered a two-pronged formalist critique challenging Filartiga's
interpretation of the text and purpose of the ATS.
They argued that Congress must specifically enact a cause of
action to incorporate specific international norms. This argument
drew upon Judge Robert Bork's concurrence in a 1984 case, TelOren v Libyan Arab Republic, in which the D.C. Circuit refused to
permit an ATS suit seeking damages for a terrorist attack.2 1 According to Judge Bork, the Filartigaapproach "would authorize
tort suits for the vindication of any international legal right." 2
This "result would be inconsistent with the severe limitations on
individually initiated enforcement inherent in international law
itself, and would run counter to constitutional limits on the role
23
of federal courts.
Scholars expanded upon Judge Bork's critique by turning to the
ATS's history.24 In the most detailed of these investigations, Professor Bradley concluded that the ATS's drafting history largely
(although not entirely) supported Judge Bork's reading. According
to Professor Bradley, there was no evidence that Congress intended the ATS to create a federal statutory cause of action for
" Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L Rev
665, 669-70 (1986).
"9See Arthur Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 Vand L Rev
1205, 1239-40 (1988); see also Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and
InternationalCases, 20 Yale J Intl L 1, 38-44 (1995).
20 Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (cited in note 3).
" Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984).
22 Id at 812.
23 Id.
24 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va J Intl
L 587 (2002); Joseph M. Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law ofNations, 18 Hastings
Intl & Comp L Rev 445 (1995).
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violations of CIL.25 Nonetheless, there was evidence that Congress
expected that alien plaintiffs could bring lawsuits under the ATS
because federal courts were authorized to apply CIL as part of
the general common law.26 But in order to satisfy Article III's
restrictions on federal court jurisdiction, Professor Bradley argued
that the ATS required any such lawsuits to be brought against a
U.S. citizen defendant.2 7 Filartiga-stylelawsuits involving two alien
parties would not be permitted, although more modern lawsuits
against U.S. corporate defendants or U.S. government actors
themselves would be-whether or not modern CIL forms part of
the federal common law.
This last question, however, has proved the most controversial.
According to the critics, giving CIL the status of federal common
law is unjustified as a matter of historical practice and doctrine.2"
Prior to Erie v Tompkins,2 9 CIL had constituted part of the general
common law, which was independently interpreted by federal and
state courts. It never enjoyed the status of the "Laws of the United
States" under Articles III and VI of the Constitution which were
supreme over inconsistent state law. Since Erie famously divested
federal courts of their general common lawmaking powers, the
federal courts also lost their power to apply CIL as general common law.3" If Erie rejected general federal common law, then it
also rejected most Filartiga-stylelawsuits because they usually involve alien-versus-alien lawsuits. 3 Such suits, lacking diversity,
would not satisfy any of the requirements of Article III federal
subject matter jurisdiction.32 Suits between aliens and U.S. defensimply become diversity lawsuits that apply
dants would, after Erie,
33
law.
common
state
23See Bradley, 42 Va
26
27

J Intl

L at 592-97 (cited in note 24).

Id at 619-37.
Id.

21 See,

for example, Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (cited in note 3).
US 64 (1938).
" Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev at 817 (cited in note 3).
29 304

31 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L Rev 319, 311 (1997).
32Id at 357-63.

Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev at 817 (cited in note 3). Of course this would
depend on whether the state in question has recognized CIL as part of its common law.
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THE FORMALIST DEFENSE

This critique provoked an energetic response from Filartiga's
defenders in the legal academy. Much of it has taken the form of
formalist rebuttals plumbing the historical origins, text, and statutory purpose of the ATS and the historical status of CIL in
domestic law. First, scholars argued that the requirement that
Congress create an explicit cause of action is ahistorical, because
the first Congress presumed that CIL lawsuits could be brought
under the general common law. 4 Thus, the first Congress fully
expected that the ATS would be used by aliens to bring lawsuits
in federal courts without any separate statutory authorization from
Congress. Such a reading is bolstered by historical materials, later
cited by the Court in Sosa, suggesting that Congress enacted the
ATS in response to violence against foreign ambassadors stationed
in the United States.35 Second, Filartiga'sdefenders cited various
Founding-era materials suggesting that CIL was understood to
have been incorporated as federal law by the Constitution's use
of the phrase "Laws of the United States" in Article I1.36 As a
matter of the original meaning, and as a matter of subsequent
judicial practice, CIL was always understood to be a question of
federal law controlled by federal courts.
Third, Filartiga'sdefenders argued that whatever the original
meaning of the ATS, the federal legislative and executive branches
had both ratified Filartiga'sreading of the ATS.3 7 For instance,
when enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)3"
amending the ATS, Congress had the opportunity to register its
disapproval of Filartiga.Instead, Congress added a cause of action
for torture explicitly designed to reject Judge Bork's concurrence
in Tel-Oren. Moreover, the TVPA's legislative history suggested
that Congress agreed with Filartiga'sconception of the status of
" See, for example, William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute:
A Response to the Originalists, 19 Hastings Intl L & Comp L Rev 221 (1996).
"' See text accompanying notes 66-69.
36See, for example, Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary InternationalLaw
as FederalLaw After Erie, 66 Fordham L Rev 393 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary InternationalLaw: A Response to ProfessorsBradley and Goldsmith,
66 Fordham L Rev 371 (1997).
" See Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing: InternationalHuman
Rights and FederalLaw, 66 Fordham L Rev 463 (1997).
3. PL 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (March 12, 1992).
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CIL as federal law.39 And the State Department had approvingly
cited the post-FilartigaATS litigation in the context of reports to
international institutions on compliance with U.S. obligations under international law.4"
D.

THE FORMALIST STALEMATE

At the very least, this debate within the legal academy established that the Restatement (Third) had prematurely embraced Filartiga.As even Filartiga'sformalist defenders have admitted, the
text of the ATS does not, by itself, establish a cause of action.
Filartiga'sdefenders and critics appear to agree on this point.4
Despite exhaustive investigations, however, neither side has been
able to fill in the textual gaps left by the ATS, nor have they
produced direct evidence on the intent of the ATS's drafters. For
instance, Filartiga'sdefenders routinely cite general statements by
the Founders about the problems of state violations of the law of
nations.4 2 But none of these statements was made in the context
of the ATS's enactment, and it remains impossible to link those
statements directly to the intentions of the its drafters.43 Critics
have fared somewhat better by examining letters from members
of the first Congress discussing the ATS. 4 But even this evidence,
while more persuasive than the general statements cited by Filartiga's defenders, has not proven conclusive.4"
Neither side has been able to provide a concrete textual or
historical resolution of the question of CIL's status as federal or
" See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, S Rep 102-249, 102d Cong (Nov 19,
1991).
40See, for example, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19
of the Convention: Report of the United States of America, UN Comm Against Torture,
Addendum, P277, UN Doc CAT/C/28/Add.5 (2000) (emphasis in original).
" See, for example, Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 592-97 (cited in note 24); Dodge, 19
Hastings Intl L & Comp L Rev at 238-40 (cited in note 34).
42See, for example, Dodge, 19 Hastings Intl L & Comp L Rev at 226-30 (cited in note
34).
41Id. Dodge describes the 1781 Continental Congress Resolution seeking state action
to punish violations of the law of nations, the Marbois affair involving a 1784 attack on
the French ambassador, and an essay from the Federalist Papers by John Jay about the
Constitution. None of these materials discuss the actual ATS nor do they even specifically
propose a statute like the ATS.
4 See Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 620-21 (cited in note 24).
41See, for example, Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 Va J Intl L
687, 697-98 (2002) (pointing out that ATS drafters' correspondence did not describe any
limits on the scope of ATS).
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state common law. The constitutional text mentions international
law only once, in allocating the power to "define and punish offences" against the law of nations to Congress.46 Filartigaand the
Restatement hold that CIL forms part of the "Law of the United
States" in Articles III and VI and, therefore, exists as federal law.47
Critics have pointed out that although there are some general
statements on the importance of maintaining national control over
CIL, there are also many general statements relegating CIL to
nonfederal status.4 8 Thus, while both sides can point to some historical evidence that supports their view, the evidence is again
inconclusive (though the critics have again provided more persuasive evidence).4 9
Despite the Filartiga critics' more persuasive arguments, it is
not possible to conclude with confidence that they are correct.
More importantly, even in areas where the critics and defenders
agree, formalist analysis provides little guidance on how to treat
the ATS after Erie's abolition of "general common law." Formalist
arguments have proven unable to establish a consensus on the
proper reading of the ATS. They also have little to say about the
ATS in a post-Erie era where CIL now includes international human rights law.5"
Stalemate between formalist supporters and critics of Filartiga
should shift the focus to functional arguments. Filartiga'sdefenders have celebrated Filartiga'spolicy benefits as the development
of CIL in U.S. domestic law and international law. Dean Koh, for
example, has called Filartiga"the Brown v Board of Education of"
the movement to bring international and foreign law into the
Const, Art I, § 8.
47630 F2d at 886-87; Restatement (Third) at § 111 comment d; § 111(2) and comment
e; § 112(2) and comment a; § 326 comment d.
" See, for example, Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev at 824-27 (cited in note
3).
Compare Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 597-619 (cited in note 24); Dodge, 42 Va J Intl
L at 702-11 (cited in note 45).
50 Professor Michael Ramsey, for instance, has argued that the text of the Constitution
supports treating CIL as "non-preemptive" federal law. Professor Ernest Young reaches
a similar conclusion. Professor Aleinikoff has recently advocated congressional action to
codify CIL along these lines. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our
Law: A ConstitutionalPerspective, 29 Pepperdine L Rev 187 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Sorting
Out the Debate Over Customary InternationalLaw, 42 Va J Intl L 365 (2002); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, InternationalLaw, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism:Reflections on the
Customary InternationalLaw Debate, 98 Am J Intl L 91 (2003).
46 US
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domestic U.S. system.5 As he noted, Filartiga opened the door
for a wave of litigation in U.S. federal courts by plaintiffs seeking
to vindicate rights under CIL, especially international human
rights law. Such litigation did not merely vindicate the rights of
victims of human rights abuses; it served a larger systemic role in
the development of CIL. In Dean Koh's conception, ATS litigation allows individuals to use the "transnational public law lit-2
igation process" to initiate, develop, and solidify norms of CIL.1
Dean Slaughter (formerly Burley) argues that modern ATS lawsuits represent a "badge of honor" for the United States. 3 The
"badge" demonstrates a deep commitment to the enforcement and
development of international human rights law. Dean Slaughter
explicitly argues in favor of the modern use of the ATS even while
conceding that "definitive proof of the intended purpose and scope
of the [ATS] is impossible." 4
Koh and Slaughter's arguments lead to the conclusion that
whether or not the ATS was actually intended to permit Filartigastyle lawsuits as a formal matter, its present benefits for U.S. foreign policy in generating respect and compliance with international law should prevail. In contrast, critics such as Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith have challenged Filartiga'sinterpretation
of the ATS as "illegitimate" after Erie,"5 but have not offered a
functional assessment of ATS litigation. As we explain in the next
part, the lack of analysis of the ATS's functional implications likely
influenced the Sosa Court's decision to preserve the doctrine, if
not the rationale, behind Filartiga.
II
This part analyzes the Supreme Court's first and only effort
to come to grips with the ATS's meaning in last Term's Sosa v
Alvarez-Machain. It criticizes the grounds on which the Court
chose to preserve the holding of Filartigadespite recognizing that
decision's serious problems under conventional federal common
law and statutory interpretation doctrines. Once stripped of its
" Koh, 100 Yale L J at 2366 (cited in note 2).
52 Id.

" See, for example, Burley, 83 Am J Intl L 461 (cited in note 2).
14Id

at 463.

" See, generally, Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev 319 (cited in note 31).
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fairly unpersuasive formalist arguments, Sosa instead shows that
the Court was reluctant to withdraw the federal judiciary from the
making and enforcement of CIL or to impose any meaningful
limitations on federal court lawmaking for unstated policy reasons.
Part III will then assess these policy reasons on institutional
grounds by comparing the costs and benefits of federal judicial
participation in the making and enforcement of CIL.
A.

SOSA

Advocates for the modern position could not have chosen a less
propitious case for the Court to review than Sosa. Sosa marked
Dr. Alvarez-Machain's second trip to the Supreme Court; his first
was notably unsuccessful.5 6 In 1985, members of a Mexican drug
cartel allegedly kidnapped an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Agency, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, and tortured him to death.
From 1984 to 1985, Agent Camarena-Salazar had proven extremely successful in frustrating the operations of the cartel, with
one raid alone seizing billions of dollars worth of marijuana. 57 Dr.
Alvarez-Machain allegedly prolonged Agent Camarena-Salazar's
life to extend the torture and interrogation. 58 Five years later, a
United States grand jury indicted Dr. Alvarez-Machain and a warrant was issued for his arrest. After efforts to persuade the Mexican
government to hand over Dr. Alvarez-Machain failed, the DEA
hired Mexican bounty hunters-including the ultimate defendant
in the case, Jose Francisco Sosa-who abducted him and then
transferred him for arrest by American officials.59
Alvarez-Machain's first trip to the Supreme Court challenged
his abduction as a violation of the United States-Mexico extradition treaty. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that the agreement did not explicitly forbid abductions that
occurred outside the extradition process. Instead, the Court applied the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, which holds that a federal court can
exercise jurisdiction over a criminal defendant brought before it
through a forcible abduction, and that due process is satisfied so
56 United States v Alvarez-Machain, 504 US 655 (1992).

s' These additional facts can be found in United States v Zuno-Arce, 44 F3d 1420 (9th
Cir 1995).
" Sosa, 124 S Ct at 2746.
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long as the defendant receives a fair trial on the substantive
charges.60 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that
the treaty applied to Alvarez-Machain's abduction and permitted
his prosecution to proceed. 6'
Upon remand, the district court tried Alvarez-Machain and ultimately granted a motion for acquittal. Alvarez-Machain then
brought a suit under the ATS against Sosa for arbitrary arrest,
which he claimed constituted a violation of the law of nations.62
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $25,000. He found a sympathetic hearing
before a panel of the Ninth Circuit and a subsequent en banc
court, which agreed that Alvarez-Machain's arbitrary arrest violated CIL and created an ATS cause of action.63 Reversing, the
Court ruled that the ATS did not provide a cause of action for
Alvarez-Machain's claim, with Justice Souter adding to his growing roster of majority opinions in foreign affairs cases.64
In winning the battle, however, opponents of the ATS may well
have lost the war. First, the Court rejected the argument that the
ATS merely granted jurisdiction to the federal courts. This was a
surprising outcome, because Justice Souter at times declared that
the ATS was, indeed, jurisdictional in nature and did not sua sponte
create any new causes of action. "All Members of the Court agree
that § 13 50 is only jurisdictional," Justice Souter remarked at one
point.6" But the ATS must do more because of the Framers' concerns about the national government's inability to enforce inter60 504 US at 661-63. The doctrine takes its name from Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436 (1886),

and Frisbie v Collins, 342 US 519, rehearing denied, 343 US 937 (1952).
61Alvarez-Machain was decided the same Term as the better-known United States v
Verdugo-Urquidez, which involved similar facts. 494 US 259 (1990). Verdugo-Urquidez
was a co-conspirator in the death of Camarena-Salazar; while DEA officials succeeded in
obtaining his transfer by Mexican police, they also searched his properties without a search
warrant. Verdugo-Urquidez challenged his prosecution on the ground that the searches
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to aliens who have no significant link to the United States when they are the subject
of government action outside the United States.
62He also brought a claim for a tort under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the
United States, which the Court dismissed and we do not discuss here. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S Ct at 2747-54.
63 255 F3d 1045 (2001), aff'd by 331 F3d 604, 641 (9th Cir 2003) (en bane).
64 See, for example, American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003);
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000).
65 124 S Ct at 2764.

BEYOND FORMALISM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

167

national law within the United States.6 6 As several historical studies
have shown, one of the problems that beset the Articles of Confederation was that the Continental Congress possessed no domestic legislative or funding powers to implement treaties.6 7 In
particular, the Court referred to the Continental Congress's 1781
appeal that states punish violations of international law, and a wellknown 1784 incident in which no federal remedy was available
for an attacked French diplomat.6 8 This history led Justice Souter
to conclude that "there is every reason to suppose that the First
Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to
be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of
action or itself decide to make some element of the law of nations
actionable for the benefit of foreigners."69 The Court, however,
could not provide any direct historical evidence to support this
point, as conventional legislative history from this period is almost
nonexistent. Rather, Justice Souter relied on what he called "[t]he
anxieties of the preconstitutional period" in rejecting the idea "that
the statute was not meant to have a practical effect."7
Second, the Court reached back to historical sources to give
substantive content to its jurisdictional-but-not-jurisdictional interpretation of the ATS. Justice Souter argued that the law of
nations, as it existed in the late eighteenth century, regulated private individual conduct by guaranteeing safe conducts, prohibiting
attacks on ambassadors, and outlawing piracy.7 According to the
Court, Congress would have intended the ATS to provide jurisdiction for this limited set of violations.72 But how does this work
with the Court's observation that the ATS does nothing more
than simply create jurisdiction for torts in violation of the law of
nations? According to Justice Souter, the ATS created jurisdiction
for a limited set of torts under international law, and those torts
66

Id at 2757.

67For one such review of the history of this period, see John Yoo, Globalism and the

Constitution: Treaties, Legislative Power, and the Original Understanding, 99 Colum L Rev
1955 (1999).
6 124 S Ct at 2756-57.
69
1Id at 2758.
70 Id.
71

Id at 2756 (citing 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *68).

72 Id.
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would be supplied by the common law. "In sum, although the ATS
is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the
reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became
law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted
on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause
of action for the modest number of international law violations
with a potential for personal liability at the time."73
Despite opening the door (to borrow the Court's metaphor) to
a reading of the ATS as enforcing substantive norms itself, the
Court appeared determined to limit the possible causes of action.
As Justice Souter wrote, "there are good reasons for a restrained
conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in
considering a new cause of action of this kind. Accordingly, we
think courts should require any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized."74 But what are those "good reasons"? They are the ones,
it seems, that have been put forward by the ATS's formalist critics.
First, the Court acknowledged that the nature of the common law
has changed between 1789 and today-it is no longer transcendental law "discovered" by the state and federal courts. Second,
the foundational Erie Railroad Company v Tompkins" in 1938
changed the role of federal courts by denying the existence of a
general federal common law and permitting only interstitial federal common lawmaking. As the Court observed, "the general
practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising
innovative authority over substantive law. It would be remarkable
to take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that
'
remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries. 76
Third, the Court in recent years has made clear that it will not
infer a private cause of action for violations of a domestic statute
unless Congress clearly so intended.7 7
3

1d
I at 2761.
Id at 2761-62.
75304 US 64 (1938).
74

76 124 S Ct at 2762.
71Id at 2762-63 (citing Correctional Services Corp. v Malesko, 534 US 61, 68 (2001);

Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 286-87 (2001)).
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These concerns reflect the federal courts' general reluctance in
the wake of Erie to engage in lawmaking. They are certainly familiar to the scholars who have explored the scope and processes
of federal common law over the last decades, several of whom have
come to doubt the modern case for the place of CIL as federal
law.78 The Court, however, added two more reasons, specific to
the foreign affairs context. First, because of changes in international law, ATS suits now can call upon federal courts to declare
that foreign governments have violated the rights of their own
citizens. This, according to Justice Souter, risks "impinging on
the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs." 79 Second, to the extent that the political
branches have addressed the issue, they have generally refused to
make human rights treaties self-executing or to create new statutory causes of action to enforce international law.8"
Despite these concerns, the Court refused to "close the door"
on the notion that the ATS gives rise to some causes of action,
or that new substantive standards could emerge as international
law evolved. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, argued in concurrence that the ATS was only
jurisdictional and could not even permit claims based on the substantive norms recognized in the late eighteenth century. Justice
Souter responded that federal common lawmaking could continue,
albeit cautiously and reluctantly. "[W]e are persuaded that federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common
law for violations of any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted."8 ' In applying this
test, the Court found that Alvarez-Machain's claim of arbitrary
detention did not rise to the level of universal recognition, binding
obligation, and specificity that characterize only the highest norms
of CIL. In part, the Court clearly was troubled by the practical
implications of recognizing such a cause of action, which would
" See, for example, Young, 42 Va J Intl L 365 (cited in note 50); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Customary InternationalLaw, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 Va J Intl L 513
(2002).
79 124 S Ct at 2763.
SoWith one notable exception, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub L No
102-256, 106 Stat 73.
"' 124 S Ct at 2765.
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require the federal courts to review "any arrest, anywhere in the
world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took
place."82 In part, the Court considered Alvarez-Machain's purported norm to be aspirational in nature, to lack a specific definition, and to be lacking in the universal acceptance by civilized
nations sufficient to qualify as a binding rule of customary law.
Although Alvarez-Machain lost his case, supporters of the modern position could gain a great deal of succor from the decision.
Justice Souter's opinion essentially left intact much of existing ATS
case law, as developed primarily by the Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. Alvarez-Machain's fault was not that he sought
a remedy through the ATS, but that he failed to show that a right
against arbitrary detention had truly become a rule of CIL.
B.

SOSA'S INTERNAL FAULTS

The debate between the Sosa majority and minority took place
on fairly straightforward formalist grounds. No one doubted that
if Congress, under its Article I, Section 8 power to define offenses
under the law of nations, had decided to incorporate international
law through a statute, it could have. The only question was
whether the ATS ought to be interpreted as doing so. The Court
could not bring itself to shut the door completely on any federal
judicial role in the enforcement of CIL. The Court's reasons,
however, were anything but convincing. Justice Souter relied on
three pieces of historical evidence, but those historical materials
fail to show that the members of the first Congress understood
the ATS to create substantive causes of action.
First, Justice Souter believed it significant that Oliver Ellsworth
had drafted the ATS, because Ellsworth had also been both a
member of the Continental Congress in 1781 when it requested
that states enact laws punishing attacks on ambassadors and violations of safe passage and a member of the Connecticut legislature
when it complied with that request. Second, the first Congress
had enacted criminal statutes prohibiting violation of safe conducts, piracy, and attacks on ambassadors,83 which Justice Souter
believed showed that Congress would not have enacted a civil
'2 Id at 2768.
"' An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, § 8, 1 Stat
113-14; id § 28 at 118.
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statute that waited upon further action to become effective. 4
Third, international law authorities at the time, most notably Vattel, declared that states should not only criminally punish those
who attack ambassadors but provide for compensation as well.8 5
To put it charitably, these pieces of historical evidence are weak.
Ellsworth's membership in the Continental Congress and the
Connecticut legislature tells us virtually nothing about the intentions of the first Congress in enacting the ATS. The Court provides no statements from Ellsworth or any of his contemporaries
about the ATS, nor does it show any consistent train of thought
on Ellsworth's part on the question of enforcement of CIL. This
stands in sharp contrast, for example, to the clear public positions
that leading Framers, such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, took on the question of the enforcement of another species
of international law, treaties, both before and after the ratification."
Justice Souter's second piece of evidence undermines his own
conclusion. If Congress were capable of enacting specific criminal
statutes addressing the problem, why would it then turn around
and enact a civil statute that most everyone concedes is ambiguous
and unclear to address the very same conduct? A third odd historical inference is made in regard to Vattel's comments. While
Vattel does believe that states should compensate victims of attacks
that violate international law, he does not address whether such
compensation should come about as a matter of civil suits.
In response to Justice Scalia's concurrence, the Court sought
further support in two precedents, Banco Nacionale de Cuba v Sabbatino,87 and The Paquete Habana.88 In the former, Justice Souter
observed, the Court had commented that "it is, of course, true
that United States courts apply international law as a part of our
own in appropriate circumstances,"89 while in the latter the Court
declared: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
124 S Ct at 2758-59.
Id at 2761 (citing Vattel, at 463-64).
16 Yoo, 99 Colum L Rev at 2010-21, 2078-82 (cited in note 67).
87376 US 398 (1964).

175 US 677 (1900).
89 376 US at 423.
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duly presented for their determination."9" From these cases, Justice
Souter drew the conclusion that "the domestic law of the United
States recognizes the law of nations," and has done so for 200
years, and issued the rejoinder that "[i]t would take some explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely
from any international norm intended to protect individuals."91
Neither of these cases, however, has anything to do with the
ATS; if anything, they undermine the idea that the federal courts
have power to enforce CIL as federal law. Sabbatino, for example,
applied the act of state doctrine in an action arising out of the
nationalization of foreign assets by the Cuban government. An
American middleman purchased sugar that had been owned by a
Cuban firm, C.A.V., whose assets had been expropriated; after it
took possession of the goods, the American company paid the
proceeds to C.A.V. rather than the Cuban government.9 2 Invoking
diversity jurisdiction, Banco Nacional sued under state law in federal district court for the money, and claimed that the legality of
the expropriation could not be reviewed because of the act of state
doctrine.
In applying the act of state doctrine, the Court rejected the
notion that its use was compelled by international law. Instead, as
Justice Harlan wrote for the Court, the act of state doctrine "arises
out of the basic relationships between branches of government in
a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of
decisions in the area of international relations."9 3 While the Court
observed that Erie Railroad did not apply to the act of state doctrine, it emphasized that the rule was necessary to promote judicial
restraint, or "a basic choice regarding the competence and function
of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community."9 4
Thus, to the extent Sabbatino enshrined the act of state doctrine
90 175 US at 700. The Court also cited The Nereide, 13 US (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815)
(Marshall, CJ) ("[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of
the land"); and Texas Industries, Inc. v Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 US 630, 641 (1981)
(recognizing that "international disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign
nations" are one of the "narrow areas" in which "federal common law" continues to exist).
91124 S Ct at 2764-65.
92376 US at 401.

9 Id at 423.
94
Id at 425.
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as federal common law, this was not because federal courts had a
mandate to incorporate international law norms as federal law.
Not only does Sabbatino ignore the ATS, but, if anything, its separation of powers core militates against Justice Souter's reading
and toward judicial abstention.
The Paquete Habana voyages even farther from the ATS. During
the Spanish-American war, American warships captured two
coastal fishing vessels off Cuba.9" After a federal district court
condemned the ships as prizes, their crew appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the American navy had captured the
ships in violation of CIL. They claimed, and the Court agreed
after a lengthy historical analysis of state practice from the 1400s,
that CIL prohibited the seizure of such civilian vessels during
wartime. Several factors distinguish The Paquete Habana from Sosa.
First, the rule of the case is not simply the oft-quoted
"[i]nternational law is part of our law." Rather, the Court continues, courts should consult "the customs and usages of civilized
nations" when "there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or juridical decision."9 6 Thus, an executive order
standing alone could override the application of CIL, which could
not happen with judicial interpretation of a federal statute such
as the ATS. Second, the case arose in prize jurisdiction, where,
like the admiralty jurisdiction, the courts had developed and applied federal common law rules. There was no "tort" as the phrase
is used in the ATS; rather, the cause of action arose under the
laws of war. Third, in The Paquete Habanaitself, the President had
ordered the military to carry out its blockade in Cuba in accordance with the international laws of war-just the "controlling
executive" action required.9 7 There was no conflict between executive policy and international law, and thus no occasion for the
judiciary to examine whether CIL independently applied.9 8
9'175 US 677.
96 Id at 700.
17 Id at 712; see also Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev at 353 n 191 (cited in
note 31); Michael J. Glennon, May the President Violate Customary InternationalLaw? Can
the President Do No Wrong? 80 Am J Intl L 923, 923 n 6 (1986).
98 Despite this, The PaqueteHabanaand Sahbatinoare routinely cited for the more tenuous
proposition that federal courts have the power to incorporate CIL as federal law directly,
without the intervention of a statute (or executive policy). See, for example, Goodman
and Jinks, 66 Fordham L Rev at 481 (cited in note 37). The reasoning must run, we
suppose, that if federal courts can directly incorporate international law as federal law,
much in the way that the judiciary creates rules to govern interstate disputes and federal
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Lastly, the Court relied on a series of questionable assumptions
about congressional approval of previous ATS decisions. According to the Court, Congress's silence must signify some level of
implicit agreement with the lower courts' expanded application of
the ATS over the last two decades. Put aside for the moment that,
even accepting the Court's argument at face value, legislative silence today could only inform us about the current Congress's
preferences, not the intentions of the first Congress that enacted
the ATS in 1789. Also put to one side that the Supreme Court
does not employ a strong form of stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases. 99 Justice Souter assumes that ATS cases are sufficiently important to outweigh other important items on Congress's limited agenda (a doubtful proposition these days), that
silence reflects the wishes of a majority (rather than, perhaps, the
opposition of filibustering minority or a President and one-third
of the Senate), and that Congress regularly overrides judicial interpretations with which it disagrees. The accuracy of these assumptions depends on facts for which no conclusive empirical data
exist,10 and there are certainly plausible arguments that run in the
other direction.
It is possible that the Court had a more subtle reason in mind
for applying what is essentially a strong form of statutory stare
decisis. Some have argued that refusing to reverse erroneous precedents has the effect of promoting democracy by forcing the legislature to make its preferences known.1"' Again, this depends on
speculative assumptions about the operations of Congress. Professor Vermeule, however, has put forward the more nuanced argument that, in the presence of empirical uncertainty, adopting a
instrumentalities, then doing so pursuant to the ATS is a far smaller step. This certainly
seems to have been the reasoning of the lower courts, most prominently the Second Circuit
in Filartiga.Filartigav Pena-Irala,630 F2d 876, 887 (2d Cir 1980).
99
See, for example, Hubbard v United States, 514 US 695, 715 (1995); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Amorous Defendant: CriticizingAbsolute Stare Decisisfor Statutory
Cases, 88 Mich L Rev 2450, 2462 (1990).
00In the leading empirical study on this question, William Eskridge concluded that
Congress does monitor judicial decisions involving statutory interpretation and will override "textualist" decisions more often than those that rely on legislative history or congressional purpose. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 Yale LJ 331 (1991). Adrian Vermeule, however, has raised significant
doubts about whether Eskridge's data actually support that conclusion. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 NYU L Rev 74, 104-06 (2000).
"' See, for example, Larry Marshall, Let Congress Do It: The Casefor an Absolute Rule of
Stare Decisis, 88 Mich L Rev 177, 208-15 (1989).
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rule of absolute stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases will
at least produce a reduction in decision costs-litigants will no
longer seek the overrule of statutory precedents, judges will not
have to expend resources reevaluating them, and the legal system
will gain in stability."°2
It is doubtful, however, whether those benefits apply in the ATS
context. Sosa brought no stability gains because the Supreme Court
had not yet addressed the validity of the ATS's modern interpretation; one could also just as easily argue that it was the Second
Circuit's decision in Filartiga,followed most vigorously by the
Ninth Circuit in the cases leading up to Sosa, that had introduced
instability to the legal system. In the context of decision costs,
courts will probably face few to zero efforts seeking to reverse the
Court's reading of the ATS. But it is unclear at best whether a
contrary result would have had any disruptive effect on the overall
stability of statutory precedents.0 3 Permitting ATS suits to continue, however, may well increase decision costs. ATS cases are
difficult. They require the acquisition of costly information: legal
rules are derived from unfamiliar materials, namely, signs of state
practice and foreign and international legal materials, and facts
come from events that occurred outside the territorial United
States. Sosa provided a far from simple test for distinguishing between enforceable and nonenforceable CIL norms. Additionally,
ATS cases often involve multipolar disputes in which multiple
potential parties raise legal claims, and chains of events are complex and multifaceted. They frequently involve delicate matters of
international relations that are the focus of policies managed by
the political branches. In the past, cases went undefended as foreign leaders accused of violations of human rights refused to appear in U.S. courts. As cases have begun to involve corporations
and elements of the federal government, however, more vigorous
defenses have begun.
Sosa purported to settle the ATS question using standard formalist tools of text, history, structure, and precedent. None of
these arguments proved convincing. Indeed, as Justice Scalia's con,02Vermeule, 75 NYU L Rev at 143-45 (cited in note 100).
0 In other words, if the Court applies only a soft canon of statutory decisis to all
statutory precedents, a decision to apply the precedent with regard to a single statute will
likely make no difference in the overall number of challenges brought to precedents in
other statutory areas.
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currence pointed out, the formalist arguments, if anything, should
have led the Court to the opposite holding. The academic stalemate may have contributed to the odd nature of the Court's decision in Sosa, which seems to acknowledge both sides of the debate, but could not really choose between them. While the Court
seems to admit the compelling nature of the formalist arguments
against federal common lawmaking in general and incorporation
of CIL in particular, it would not adopt their conclusion. At the
same time, the Court could not develop any convincing reasons
of its own, based in the text, structure, or history of the ATS, to
allow judicial development of substantive causes of action under
the ATS. It settled upon a muddled, tentative decision that kept
the door open for federal court recognition of certain CIL causes
of action, but failed to explain how far open that door should
remain or why that door should be open in the first place.
III
The Court did not consider the ATS from a functional
perspective, even though it might well have done so given its
unsatisfactory formalist rationales. A functional analysis seeks to
determine whether, from a normative perspective, judicial implementation of international law through the ATS is the more effective method to achieve the government's desired policies. This
approach asks two questions. First, what are the goals or purposes
of the ATS? In other words, what end is the government seeking
to achieve? Second, does a comparative analysis show that the
courts or the executive would more effectively achieve those goals
or purposes in this area?1" 4 This analysis seeks to move beyond
the formalist stalemate over whether the ATS authorizes federal
courts to enforce and develop CIL to the second-order question
whether other institutions, in particular the executive branch, are
better suited to carrying out the purpose that the Sosa Court assigns to federal courts.
04 Scholars such as Neil Komesar, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule have undertaken
a similar approach to questions ranging from statutory interpretation to regulatory decision
making. See, for example, Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in
Law, Economics, and Public Policy (Chicago, 1994); Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele,
Interpretationand Institutions, 101 Mich L Rev 885 (2003).
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STATUTORY PURPOSE

The starting point for evaluating the Court's approach to the
ATS is to define its purpose. We do not mean "purpose" in the
sense used in the legislative history debate, in which "purposivism"
suggests an approach that gives courts greater discretion to interpret statutory language to achieve the "purpose" of a statute.'l5
Rather, before we can address the effectiveness of the Sosa Court's
interpretation of the ATS, we first must identify the national policy
sought. We would conduct a similar inquiry to determine whether
any institutional mechanism can be regarded as better or worse
in comparison with another. We cannot judge, for example,
whether the independent counsel statute was superior to the preand post-Act system of appointment of special counsels by the
Attorney General, unless we first have defined the problem that
Congress sought to address.1"6 This will give us the necessary
context within which to judge whether courts are the best institutional option to achieve national policy.
1. Sosa and statutory purpose. Sosa proved a disappointment in
identifying the purpose of the ATS. Justice Souter began his inquiry with an examination of the ATS's historical context. The
first Congress's silence has left scholars in the position of arguing
over levels of generality. Critics of the modern position have argued for a fairly low level of generality, and so have looked to the
specific placement of the ATS within the overall structure of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.17 As the Judiciary Act of 1789 generally
created the basics of the federal court system and established federal subject matter jurisdiction, it would be odd to read the ATS
as pursuing a different purpose. Section 1350 only sought to recognize the basis for a type of party-based jurisdiction-suits by
aliens-that Congress subsequently could use in enacting specific
causes of action. ATS defenders have described the purpose of the
ATS at a fairly high level of generality. According to them, the
United States wanted to take its place among the nations of the
105 See, for example, John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum
L Rev 1, 3, 7 (2001) (criticizing purpose-based approach to statutory interpretation);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, StatutoryInterpretationas PracticalReasoning,
42 Stan L Rev 321 (1990) (arguing that courts should make policy judgments in implementing statutory purpose).
"' Compare Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988) (discussing benefits of independent

counsel statute).
"' Bradley, 42 Va J Intl L at 593 (cited in note 24).
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world, and the Framers believed that this required the United
States to enforce and obey the law of nations. °8 In fact, one can
understand the academic debate over the ATS as a failure to come
to agreement on the appropriate level of generality to use in interpreting the statute.
The Court, however, followed neither of these approaches.
While it looked to the diplomatic problem that had beset the
national government under the Articles of Confederation, it rejected the idea that the ATS should be so limited. Justice Souter
also looked to the opinion of Framing-era legal authorities that
such attacks required a damages remedy, but then rejected that
purpose as too narrow. Given that Congress has enacted statutory
crimes to address these violations, such a reading would render
the ATS effectively meaningless.
Sosa concludes that the ATS's purpose is to provide a remedy
for CIL violations that have achieved universal consensus." 9 Unlike its earlier discussion of the framing-era context, however, Sosa
fails to explain what purpose this broader reading serves. It is easy
to understand, for example, why the ATS's statutory purpose might
extend beyond providing jurisdiction for subsequent statutory
causes of action. Attacks on foreign diplomats had disrupted American foreign relations, national law provided no remedy, so Congress sought to fill the gap by creating a damages action. But Sosa
reads the ATS to go beyond Blackstone's trio of offenses that were
aimed chiefly at prohibiting CIL violations by American private
parties. Moreover, Congress has already fulfilled this goal by enacting federal statutes implementing the very international law
obligations-prohibitions on torture, genocide, and war crimesthat Sosa identified as cognizable ATS claims. °
Sosa's broader reading of the ATS, therefore, encompasses fundamentally different CIL norms and contemplates more than simply preventing U.S. citizens from violating international law. As
the Sosa Court noted, the most significant uses of the statute have
included actions by aliens against officials of their own governments, as with the Filartigacase against a Paraguayan officer for
108

See, for example, Burley, 83 Am J Intl L 461 (cited in note 2).

09The Court did not address the ATS's additional language permitting torts for vio-

lations of treaties.
"0 See, for example, Torture Statute, 18 USC § 2340 (2000); War Crimes Act, 18 USC
§ 2441 (2000); Genocide Convention Implementation Act, 18 USC § 1091 (2000).
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torture, the Trajano suit in the Ninth Circuit against former Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos, or the Karadzic litigation against
a Serb warlord.1 ' These cases did not involve the failure of the
United States to enforce international law against its own citizens;
they did not involve American citizens as defendants; nor did the
events at issue have any significant nexus with the United States
at the time of their commission. Rather than preventing Americans
from causing offense to foreign nations, Sosa allows aliens to sue
other aliens, corporations, foreign governments, and perhaps even
the United States government for violations of international law.
The ATS's purpose has been transformed from keeping the United
States out of diplomatic incidents to keeping other nations to their
international obligations.
In fact, the ATS may play only a marginal role in achieving
what the Sosa Court believed to be its original purpose: to ensure
the United States and its citizens comply with international law.
So far, the United States government has enjoyed sovereign immunity to ATS suits, as it would to other causes of action unless
specifically overridden." 2 Criminal laws already exist to prosecute
Americans who commit serious violations of international law of
the kind that concerned Blackstone." 3 The Sosa Court's refusal to
limit enforceable CIL norms to those supporting the statute's original purpose embraces a broader statutory purpose-enforcing international law against foreign nations on behalf of that nation's
citizens. But Sosa nowhere explains (a) what problem Congress (of
1789 or of today) seeks to address, or (b) why or how the ATS
might be a means to solve the problem. This is a serious defect
in the Court's opinion.
2. Possible statutory purposes. Academic supporters of the ATS
have suggested a number of possible statutory purposes. None of
them, however, are linked in any significant way to traditional
signs of congressional purpose, such as other parts of the U.S.
Code or legislative history:
- the ATS could be designed to allow the United States to speak
.. Filartigav Pena-Irala,630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980); In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos,
25 F3d 1467 (9th Cir 1994); Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F3d 232 (2d Cir 1995).
112 See, for example, Sosa, 124 S Ct at 2747-48; Al Odah v United States, 321 F3d 1134,
1149-50 (DC Cir 2003) (Randolph, J, concurring), reversed on other grounds; Rasul v
Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004).
"' See sources cited note 83.
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control over
with one voice in foreign affairs by centralizing
14
international law in the federal courts;"
" the ATS could have as its purpose to prevent American states,
corporations, and individuals from violating international
law; 115
" or the ATS could be intended to promote the development
and enforcement of international law itself.
The first two purposes seem especially unlikely. There does not
seem to be any firm evidence that these are systematic problems.
Even if they were, Congress has ample tools at its disposal that
are less blunt than incorporating CIL wholesale. Congress, for
example, has enacted criminal laws prohibiting the commission of
torture, genocide, and war crimes, the three most significant norms
recognized as jus cogens." 6 It has also specified particular conditions under which plaintiffs can bring civil suits alleging torture
or injuries from terrorist acts into federal courts.'1 7
That leaves the third purpose. Such a broad, open-ended goal
evokes the liberal internationalism of a Woodrow Wilson or
Jimmy Carter, and may explain why the Sosa Court shied away
from stating it clearly. We do not seek to criticize this purpose.
Congress has sufficient authority under Article I, Section 8 to enact
a statute that created a cause of action to achieve it. We also do
not dispute that international human rights recently has played an
important role in recent American foreign policy, from President
Reagan's criticism of the "evil empire" of the Soviet Union to
President Clinton's decision to wage war in Kosovo. We need only
consider whether this is indeed the ATS's purpose, or at least that
the Sosa Court believes this to be its purpose, to discuss whether
the ATS actually makes sense as a tool to achieving its goals.
Although the Sosa Court did not explicitly embrace this view,
its endorsement of lower federal court decisions expanding the
scope of the ATS supports this broader purpose. As Sosa itself
more or less admits, the lower federal courts clearly have expanded
the ATS beyond its original purpose. What is important, however,
..
4 Harold H. Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law? 111 Harv L Rev 1824, 1832
(1998).

"1 Id at 1840, 1850.
..
6 Torture Statute, 18 USC § 2340 (2000); War Crimes Act, 18 USC § 2441 (2000);
Genocide Convention Implementation Act, 18 USC § 1091 (2000).
...
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 USC § 1350; 18 USC § 2333.
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is not whether this is consistent with the intentions of the first
Congress, on which little historical evidence exists, but whether
that purpose is in line with the preferences of current Congresses.
While it is unlikely that the Congress at the time of Sosa's decision
would have delegated such authority, it is possible that it would
have met with congressional approval at the time of Filartiga.
Those decisions cannot be overturned by Congress today, even if
the President and the median member of Congress disagree, unless
they can put together enough votes to override a filibuster in the
Senate. So today we can say, after Sosa, that the ATS promotes a
national policy in favor of the development and enforcement of
international law. It remains unusual, however, in foreign affairs
because it is delegated to the federal courts, rather than the political branches.
B.

INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Now that we have determined the statutory purpose most consistent with the Sosa decision, we can analyze whether the delegation of power to the federal courts is the most effective means
of policy implementation. This section argues that the design and
operation of the judiciary give it a comparatively weak institutional
vantage point from which to achieve foreign affairs goals of the
sort envisioned by the ATS. This is not to say that federal courts
cannot play a role in the development and enforcement of CIL.
Instead, we are making the more modest second-order argument
that as a matter of institutional competence, the federal judiciary
suffers significant disadvantages in such a role compared to the
executive branch. We necessarily base our institutional assessment
on certain generalizations and assumptions about how these institutions work because it is difficult to imagine a sufficiently rigorous empirical test of these functional claims. Even conceding
these limitations to our approach, in light of the formalist stalemate over the proper interpretation of the ATS, identifying these
institutional disadvantages tips the scale against the Sosa Court's
reading of the ATS.
1. Judicialcompetence. It is important to distinguish between both
micro- and macro-level characteristics of the judiciary. Several
characteristics of the federal courts at the micro level-the operation of individual judges in individual lawsuits-limit the information that flows to courts and the options available to them.
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At a macro level, certain system-wide features of the Article III
judiciary may poorly equip it to carry out national policy on a
global scale.
a) Micro-institutionalfactors. Defining features of the Article III
courts make them superior to other branches in performing certain
functions, but also make them comparatively less well suited to
playing a leading foreign relations role. Federal courts are designed to be independent from politics, to passively allow parties
to drive litigation, and to receive information in highly formal
ways. These characteristics may make courts more neutral in their
decision making and fairer in their attitude toward parties. But
they also may render them less effective tools in achieving national
goals in international relations. Comparison of courts with other
institutions may make these points more salient.
An initial difference between courts and other institutions is
access. Compared with other institutions, courts have high barriers
to access.118 Congress has somewhat moderately difficult barriersit is generally thought that interest groups must provide campaign
contributions or political support in order to obtain access to political leaders.119 The executive branch has lower barriers than
Congress; it is probably easier for individuals and groups to provide information to, and make requests of, agencies, although perhaps with no greater chances of success.
By contrast, courts have numerous doctrines that limit access.
Under standing doctrine, for example, plaintiffs must have suffered
an actual injury in fact which is traceable to conduct on the part
of a defendant who can remedy the harm. 2 ° The timing of the
case must be just right, neither too early and therefore unripe nor
too late and therefore moot.121 It cannot raise political questions
whose determination is constitutionally vested in another
branch.122 The plaintiff must actually be able to claim to benefit
from a cause of action created under federal law. Litigation itself
Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 125 (cited in note 104).
See Robert Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 51-74 (Princeton, 1999) (discussing
interest group theory of politics). Other studies, however, show that members of Congress
are responsive to public pressure as reflected through the media and constituents.
120 See, for example, Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992).
121 See, for example, DeFunis v Odegaard, 416 US 312 (1974) (mootness); United Public
Workers v Mitchell, 330 US 75 (1947) (ripeness).
122 Nixon v United States, 506 US 224 (1993).
18

19
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demands significant resources, at least in comparison with means
of accessing the executive or legislative branches.
There are also significant differences in the way courts acquire
and process information. Courts gather knowledge through a
painstaking and expensive process of discovery, conducted by the
contending parties. That information must satisfy the federal rules
of evidence-it must survive tests for relevance, credibility, and
reliability-and the parties must present it to the court in accordance with formal courtroom procedures. By contrast, the executive branch collects information through agency experts, a national and global network of officials and agents, and links with
outside groups and foreign governments. Congress can acquire
information from the executive branch or outside groups via relatively inexpensive hearings. Also, a court generally cannot update
its information except in the context of a new case. Thus, if a
court has made a decision based on information available to it at
time 1, it generally will not continue to gather information thereafter-even if it would lead it to change its decision-until another
case raising the same issue appears.123
Article III creates significant limitations on the ability of federal
courts to dynamically integrate its actions with national foreign
policy. Once the President and Congress have enacted a statute
or the President and the Senate have approved a treaty, the judiciary's constitutional responsibility is to execute those goals in
the context of Article III cases or controversies. Federal judges
cannot alter or refuse to execute those policies, even if the original
circumstances that gave rise to the statute or treaty have
changed.'2 4 If a federal court, for example, finds that a defendant
has violated the Helms-Burton Act by "trafficking" in property
confiscated by the Cuban government, it must render judgment
for an American plaintiff who once owned that property. 2 ' Article
III requires a federal court to reach that decision even if the effects
of the judgment in that particular case would actually harm the
national interest or conflict with other countries' view of CIL.
.23
See, for example, Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 NC L Rev 643 (2000).
24 For a contrary view, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes
(Harvard, 1985).
121 See John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton
Act, 20 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 747 (1997).
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A last micro difficulty arises from the substantive challenge presented by CIL. CIL is a very different subject than that usually
encountered by federal courts. Many observers admit that the very
concept of CIL-law that "results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation" rather than through positive enactment' 2 6-is fraught with
difficulty. 27 It is unclear whether CIL should prevail because of
actual state consent to a rule, or because state practice reflects
international consensus on a rule. 28 It is unclear how widespread
state practice must be, how long it must continue, and how consistent it must be to qualify as CIL. 29 It is not even clear what
counts as state practice, whether it should be limited to actions
or declarations, and whose practice-that of the great powers, that
of the leading nations of each region in the world, that of every
nation in the world-matters. "30 It is not clear when state practice
can be said to arise out of a sense of legal obligation rather than
through coincidence or expedient coordination.3 It is also controversial whether the views of other actors, such as law professors
and judges, should have weight in determining international law. 32
Even if the very nature of CIL were not so uncertain and ambiguous, it is likely that the federal courts either would experience
a high error rate or high decision costs in determining its content.
CIL involves sources that are not often encountered by federal
judges or American lawyers. The very source of CIL-state practice-is not easily discovered. State practice may not even be reflected in publicly available documents, but may more often lie in
the archives of the State Department and foreign ministries, or
126 Restatement

(Third) at § 102(2) (cited in note 13).
Compare Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in InternationalLaw at 4 (Cornell, 1971), with Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public InternationalLaw at 5-6 (Oxford, 4 ed
1990).
128 Compare Prosper Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw? 77 Am J
Intl L 413, 433 (1983).
129 These well-known problems with CIL are discussed in D'Amato, The Concept of
Custom 6-10 (cited in note 127).
131See Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 Va J Intl L 449,
127

500-501 (2000) (describing lack of agreement on sources of state practice for purposes
of determining CIL).
13 Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U Chi
L Rev 1113, 1176-77 (1999).
132 This practice has been criticized
by Bradley and Goldsmith, 110 Harv L Rev at
872-76 (cited in note 3).
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may rest in the preserve of unwritten custom. American-trained
judges-almost all of them generalists-would have to survey the
actions of governments over the course of dozens if not hundreds
of years, and make fine-grained judgments not just about what
states have done, but why they did it. Take the most prominent
example of a federal court attempting to divine CIL: the Paquete
Habana case itself. Justice Gray surveyed centuries of policies,
declarations, and naval actions to determine the legal status of
coastal fishing vessels. It appears that he may have gotten the
record of state practice wrong-states did not consistently refrain
from seizing small fishing vessels during wartime.133 Even if Justice
Gray had accurately described practice, he failed to show that the
protection of coastal fishing vessels had arisen out of a sense of
legal obligation, rather than out of an interest by states in coordinating their activities or because of a fear of retaliation. 34
A useful analogy can be made here to the arguments about the
use of legislative history. Whether courts should consult legislative
history has become one of the focal points for broader debates
about the nature of legislation, judicial competencies, and the purpose of interpretation. To summarize briefly, many who believe
that courts should seek out Congress's "intent" or broader "purpose" find reliance on legislative history, along with other policy
considerations, generally acceptable. 3 ' A minority argue that legislative history ought not be used, either because there is no such
thing as a collective intent or because consulting legislative history
evades the formal separation of powers. 36 Professor Vermeule
makes a similar argument to the one made here: even if courts
should seek legislative intent, their "limited interpretive competence" suggests that they "might do better, even on intentionalist
grounds, by eschewing legislative history than by consulting it."137
133 Goldsmith
134

and Posner, 66 U Chi L Rev at 1148 n 101 (cited in note 131).

Id.

"' See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal? 96 Mich
L Rev 1509 (1998) (reviewing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts
and the Law (Princeton, 1997)); Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent
and Public Choice, 74 Va L Rev 423 (1988); Eskridge and Frickey, 42 Stan L Rev (cited in
note 105).
136See, for example, John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum
L Rev 673 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HarvJ L & Pub Pol 61, 68 (1994).
131See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan L Rev 1833 (1998).
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Judges may have limited abilities to understand and properly use
legislative history, leading to high decision costs in conducting
extensive reviews of legislative history without any corresponding
reduction (and perhaps even an increase) in error costs.
If this is true with legislative history, these costs will only be
compounded with CIL. The sources of legislative history at least
rest within the general bounds of American public law, and so will
be familiar to most judges. While expensive to gather and analyze
in relation to other forms of American legal research,'3 8 legislative
history may well be cheap to use in comparison to sources of CIL,
which comes in different languages, involves not just texts but
practices, and is recorded in sources that are often not publicly
available. Even the use of more conventional public sources, such
as multilateral treaties and the resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly, has serious interpretive problems. It is highly
questionable, for example, that nations that refuse to sign treaties,
for example, should be held to the same norms because they have
"ripened" into custom, or that CIL should be read to go beyond
the standards set by a widely joined treaty. Decisions by organs
of the United Nations, particularly of the General Assembly, have
no formal authority to declare CIL, if by definition that law represents the practice of states, not the opinions of international
organizations.' 3 9 The most pertinent evidence of state practice will
be the most expensive to come by, and there is no empirical showing yet that federal courts will perform better in their use than
any other institution.
b) Macro-institutionalfactors. The organization of the federal judiciary as an institution perhaps has even more significant effects
on the comparative ability of the courts to achieve foreign policy
goals. First, the federal judiciary is a generalist institution composed of generalist judges. Members of the judiciary are not usually
chosen because of any expertise in any particular subject, unlike,
say, the way in which scientists may be hired for work at the
'3 See, for example, Kenneth W. Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History,
1987 Duke L J 371, 377; Eskridge, 96 Mich L Rev at 1541 (cited in note 135); Vermeule,
50 Stan L Rev at 1868-69 (cited in note 137).
139The legitimacy of this "new" CIL is debated by Prosper Weil, 77 Am J Intl L 413
(cited in note 128), and Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Lawmaking, 12 Australian YB Intl L 22 (1992), and is summarized in Antonio
Cassese and Joseph H. H. Weiler, eds, Change and Stability in InternationalLawmaking
(De Gruyter, 1988).
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Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, or
the Food and Drug Administration. This is even more so the case
in foreign affairs. Judges are not chosen because of any background
in specific regions or areas, nor are they selected because they have
experience in national security issues. As an institution, the judiciary is unlikely to have great facility with international legal,
political, or economic theories or materials, and its members are
more likely to be chosen because of their prominence as litigators
or as public officials. It is difficult to recall more than a handful
of judges who had significant foreign affairs experience before their
appointment to the federal bench.
Second, of the three branches of government, the judiciary is
the most decentralized. The front line of the judiciary is composed4
of 94 district courts, which are staffed by more than 667 judges. 1
Until appellate courts have ruled on a legal issue, the judges in
these district courts can hold 667 different interpretations of the
law. There are 13 federal courts of appeals, with 179 judges. 1 4'
The Supreme Court currently hears between 70 and 85 cases per
year, while about 60,000 cases a year are filed in the Courts of
Appeals and about 325,000 cases are filed a year in the district
14 2
Given the other demands on the Supreme Court's casecourts.
load, it is doubtful that the Court could devote a significant portion
of its docket to correcting erroneous interpretation of international law, mistaken interference with foreign policy, or misapplications of the ATS. Unless this happens, the geographic organization of the federal courts may well produce disharmony on
questions of foreign policy and a diversity of possible applications
of international law.
In some areas, this level of decentralization might not pose such
a problem. Geographically organized courts may better tailor national policies to local conditions, allow for diversity and experimentation in federal policies, and provide a more effective voice
for local communities in federal decision making. These are not
positive values, however, in foreign affairs. The Constitution
140 History of Federal Judgeships, US District Courts, at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tableh.pdf.
14 History of Federal Judgeships, US Courts of Appeals, at http://www.uscourts.gov/
history/tablec.pdf.
41 Judicial Caseload Indicators 2003, at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2003/front/
Mar03Txt.pdf.
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sought to centralize authority over foreign affairs to provide the
nation with a single voice in its international relations, so as to
prevent other nations from taking advantage of the disarray that
had characterized the Articles of Confederation.'4 3 Indeed, in cases
such as Crosby and Garamendi,the Court recently has preempted
state efforts to influence foreign nations precisely because of the
need for a uniform foreign policy set by the Congress or President.1" This rationale, however, offered to justify national preeminence over the 50 states, applies with force to a federal judiciary
of 94 district courts and 13 appellate courts. Judicial implementation of foreign policy promises disharmony where uniformity is
supremely important.
Third, institutional structure suggests that judicial activity in
foreign policy may be slow, in terms of both implementation and
self-correction. Lawsuits can often take years to complete. Even
when cases are expedited, they require many months from time
of filing to final judgment and appeal. To use Sosa as an example,
eleven years passed between the filing of his ATS claim in federal
district court and the Supreme Court's decision last Term. While
they did not reach extensive discovery or trial proceedings, recent
Supreme Court cases on Massachusetts's efforts to sanction Burma
and California's efforts to provide remedies for Holocaust victims
145
still took several years to adjudicate.
Delay also affects not just initial decisions, but also monitoring
and feedback. Slowness obviously impedes the swift and effective
execution of foreign policy. Delay infects the judiciary's institutional systems for communicating between its different units and
for correcting errors. While the federal courts have an appeals
court system for detecting and correcting errors, it can take
months if not years to run its course. Even if a district or circuit
judge acts in defiance of established circuit or Supreme Court
precedent, litigation is needed to correct the error. Standards of
review concerning fact-finding may even render some decisions
immune from appellate review despite contrary or conflicting re141See, generally, Frederick Marks, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making
of the Constitution (LSU, 1973).
" Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003) (cited in note 64); Crosby v National Foreign Trade

Council, 530 US 363 (2000).
14'The lawsuit in Garamendi began in 1999 and was not finally decided by the Supreme
Court until 2003. 539 US at 512. Crosby began in 1998 and was not decided by the Supreme
Court until 2000. 530 US at 371.
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suits reached by different trial courts in similar cases. Transmission
of information identifying and correcting errors may become garbled within the system, which helps explain the repeated cycles of
repeal and remand that can occur in the context of a single case.146
Judicial errors or deviations from policy may take years to reverse
or may even go entirely uncorrected.
The judiciary's institutional characteristics render it superior to
other institutions for certain kinds of decisions. It can address
issues more fairly, with less interference from the political
branches, and it can implement federal policy over a wide number
of cases throughout the country. It can help solve political commitment problems between interest groups or between branches
of government due to its high level of insulation from outside
control. Its virtues, however, also create its problems as an institutional actor in foreign affairs. Its evenhandedness and passivity
create problems in effectively gathering and processing information and in coordinating its policies with other national actors. Its
procedural fairness and geographic decentralization prevent it
from acting swiftly in a unified fashion, and it lacks effective tools
for the rapid assimilation of feedback and the correction of errors.
Even if the statutory purpose of the ATS is the development
and enforcement of international law generally, and human rights
more specifically, the courts are by no means the most effective
institutional mechanism. ATS suits require courts to acquire information about events that usually have occurred abroad and that
involve parties outside their jurisdiction. They demand that courts
interpret and apply norms whose sources can be difficult to discover and discern. They often involve sensitive judgments that
may impact broader, ongoing relations with other nations. This
is not to say that courts could not perform this function if need
be; courts have interpreted open-ended clauses of the Constitution
and have attempted to manage institutions ranging from schools
to prisons.'47 Rather, the central question is, from a comparative
institutional perspective, whether there is reason to think that
courts would be equal or superiorto other branches of government
in achieving national policy on international law or human rights.
2. Executive branch competence and comparative institutional ad146Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory ofStare Decisis, I J Legal Stud 125, 125-34 (1972).
' See John Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot? The Inherent Remedial Power of the
Federal Courts, 84 Cal L Rev 1121 (1996).
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vantage. To complete our study, we must conduct a comparative
analysis. As Professors Sunstein, Vermeule, and Komesar have argued with regard to allocating decisions among courts, agencies,
148
and markets, simply deciding on a social goal is not enough.
We must also make comparative judgments on the ability of different institutions to achieve those goals. Such comparative institutional judgments have been applied in both constitutional and
statutory interpretation. 149 Even if the judiciary would perform
poorly at enforcing national policy in the human rights area, it
still may be the best institutional mechanism available. A comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the ATS at promoting
international law and human rights requires a judgment of the
relative ability of the judiciary and the institution most likely to
replace it: the executive.
a) Deference and foreign affairs. Evaluation of the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of the judiciary versus the executive
in implementing foreign affairs goals parallels arguments surrounding the review of agency interpretations of law.' 5 ° In Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 5 ' the Court
established a well-known two-part test for reviewing executive
branch interpretation of ambiguous statutes. First, the courts ask
whether Congress has clearly addressed the interpretive question
at hand. If not, then judges are to defer to the agency interpretation
if it is based on a reasonable or permissible reading of the statute."'
We are not so much interested in whether Chevron establishes
the correct rule as we are in the comparative institutional considerations that motivated the Court's thinking. Chevron itself iden...
Sunstein and Vermeule, 101 Mich L Rev at 917-19 (cited in note 104); Komesar,
Imperfect Alternatives (cited in note 104).
141 Constitutional scholars such as John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper, for instance, have
applied such comparative institutional analysis to defend their theory of constitutional
interpretations. Choper's defense of political safeguards for federalism relied heavily on
his assessment of the comparative institutional advantages of judicial versus political branch
enforcement of federalism. Jesse Choper, JudicialReview and the National PoliticalProcess:
A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago, 1981).
"soCurtis Bradley has also sought to draw upon Chevron in the foreign affairs context.
His inquiry concerned whether Chevron principles support judicial deference to executive
branch interpretation of different forms of international law. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron
Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va L Rev 649 (2000). Our approach is different: we seek
to learn from Chevron's observations on the relationship between agencies and courts to
reach judgments about the institutional abilities of each branch.
151467 US 837 (1984).
152Id at 842-43.
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tified two reasons of judicial policy that supported this approach.
First, judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations assumes that agencies usually possess expertise in administering regulatory statutes superior to that of the judiciary. Second, deference
recognizes that the executive branch can claim greater political
accountability than the judiciary, implying that interpretation
ought to pursue present policy goals and that the electorate ultimately could change unwanted interpretations.1 53
Scholars have debated in great detail the relative virtues and
defects of the Chevron regime, and the Court recently has demarcated the limits of deference to agency interpretation at rule
making and formal adjudication.15 4 Agency expertise and accountability, however, continue to remain central justifications for judicial deference, and it is useful to understand them through an
institutional lens. Chevron locates interpretation in the institution
that has the superior level of technical competence. Unlike federal
judges, agency personnel are experts at their subject, who often
have received their training and devoted their careers to policymaking in a discrete specialty, and have access to technical experience and information accumulated by a wide bureaucracy.
To be sure, agency decision making does not depend solely on
technical decisions, but rather requires officials to reach decisions
involving a mixture of factual determinations and value judgments.155 And agencies are not just run by civil servants, but are
managed by a thin crust of political appointees chosen by the
President. But executive branch officials are more politically accountable than federal judges, and mistakes of agency interpretation are more likely to be corrected. Congress also has any number of formal and informal tools for placing political pressure on
agencies to reverse unwanted actions. Congress can hold hearings,
refuse to confirm nominees to the agency, and reduce agency budgets for enforcement. Congress can use interest groups and the
media to generate public opposition to executive policy.
By contrast, the federal judiciary is designed to be outside the
153On this point, see Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and Policy,
58 Geo Wash L Rev 821 (1990).
154 United States v Mead Corp., 533 US 218 (2001).
55 There is a wide literature, for example, on whether cost-benefit analysis should be
used by agencies and whether they are capable of following it properly. See, for example,
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165
(1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J 1981 (1998).
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reach of normal politics. Federal judges have life tenure and a
permanent salary, and for the most part have reached the end of
their official careers so they are not beholden to political groups
for their advancement. Because of its internal system of precedent,
the federal courts generally do not reverse a decision simply because of political opposition or pressure. In order to change a
judicial decision, Congress generally can resort only to the single
formal process set out in Article I, Section 7 for the enactment
of legislation. Because of the hurdles of bicameralism and presentment, this makes it far more difficult for Congress to correct
mistakes in policy by the federal courts. I 6
In terms of comparative institutional advantage, it may be useful
to express these values in terms of error and decision costs. We
can make the reasonable assumption that deference to agencies is
likely to lead to lower error costs in decision making. Their technical competence in specialized areas is less likely to produce incorrect decisions because agencies may be more familiar with the
meaning of Congress's instructions in the context of a heavily
regulated, factually complex field. Their expertise and knowledge
also make it more likely that they will set the appropriate technical
standard within the parameters set by Congress. At the same time,
however, agencies may well incur higher decision costs than courts.
They reach their judgments after gathering broader amounts of
information than judges, although they do not do so within the
context of litigation. Their decisions follow the pure standard of
acting reasonably under the totality of the circumstances, rather
than following clear ex ante rules. Error correction by the political
branches, however, seems superior to that of courts. Holding oversight hearings and threatening budget cuts present a far less difficult method to change incorrect agency interpretations than does
the enactment of specific override legislation.
A third justification for judicial deference did not appear in
Chevron, but implicates core questions of institutional design. A
President provides a single policy vision that sets a uniform regulatory policy throughout the nation. Federal courts, by contrast,
are organized into thirteen different circuit courts of appeals organized by geography. Because of the Supreme Court's limited
docket, the decisions of the circuit courts represent the final word
156See,

for example, Cooter, The Strategic Constitution (cited in note 119).
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of the Article III judiciary in 99 percent of all cases. Chevron, in
essence, promotes national uniformity in administrative law by
ensuring that statutes will not be interpreted differently in different regions." 7 If federal courts could review agency interpretations de novo or under a less deferential regime, it is likely that
administrative rules would be applied differently in different circuits.
b) The executive branch's institutional advantages. These institutional considerations bear significantly on the choice between
courts and executives in foreign affairs. First, consider the factor
of institutional structure. Putting aside for the moment the formal
question of where the President's foreign affairs power comes
from, the executive branch seems much better structured for the
conduct of foreign relations than the courts. As Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 70, the executive is structured for
speed and decisiveness in its actions, and is better able to maintain
secrecy in its information gathering and its deliberations. "Decision, activity, secrecy, dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than
the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the
number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."'5 8 In the
years leading up to World War II, the Supreme Court made a
similar observation. United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation famously observed: "In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation." Quoting from a Senate report, the Court further
explained that "[t]he nature of transactions with foreign nations
• . .requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch."'5 9 As Dean Koh describes it, "[h]is decision-making processes can take on degrees of
speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other governmental institution can match. 'lO If anything, national security and
' Peter Strauss, One HundredFifty Casesper Year: Some Implicationsof the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093 (1987).
' Federalist 70 (Hamilton) in Merrill Jensen, John P. Kaminski, and GaspareJ. Saladino,
eds, 16 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 397 (State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1986).

'59299 US 304, 319 (1936).
160 Harold Koh, National Security Constitution 119 (Yale, 1990).
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foreign policy demands since World War II have led to even more
concentration of authority in the executive branch. The history
of American foreign relations has been the story of the expansion
of the presidency thanks to its structural abilities to wield power
quickly, effectively, and in a unitary manner-a fact bemoaned by
critics of the "imperial presidency."''
Institutional design leads to advantages in specialized competence. The United States operates large bureaucracies designed to
develop and implement foreign policy. For fiscal year 2005, for
example, the Bush administration's budget request for the State
Department and other foreign affairs agencies totaled $31.5 billion. 6 2 The State Department employed 32,997 officials and civil
servants. 16 3 That does not include the budget and personnel figures
for the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Treasury Department, the Justice Department, and the White
House staff, all of which have significant roles in developing foreign policy. These agencies employ experts in specific subjects,
such as arms control or human rights, or certain nations and
regions, such as State's Asia or Africa desks. Many of the staff who
work on these issues have developed their areas of expertise by
spending their careers immersing themselves in local cultures,
learning languages, or gaining experience in the international politics of a region. The federal judiciary, by contrast, operates on a
budget of roughly $5.42 billion with 34,399 employees, who must
devote their efforts to the adjudication of disputes involving federal
law.
Executive branch agencies have access to broader forms of information about foreign affairs than those available to a court. In
regard to classes of information, the executive branch has access
to certain types of information, such as that produced by clandestine agents or electronic eavesdropping, which cannot be publicly disclosed. Even though such information cannot be produced
in an open court, it can provide invaluable data on the plans and
intentions of other governments and the possible effects of American foreign policy. In terms of receiving and processing that information, the executive branch is not restricted by the structures
.6 Id at 118-23; see generally Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The ImperialPresidency (Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
162 Fact Sheet, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/28709.htm.
'63
Table, at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/htm/2004/march/table2.asp.
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that limit the information that a court may consider.
By contrast, the very nature of courts as decision-making institutions may impede their ability to perform a role in foreign
affairs. As work on structural injunctions has shown,16 4 courts are
relatively poor at gathering information, especially when a case
extends beyond the pure historical facts behind a single transaction
or accident to broader political, economic, and social events and
trends. Courts experience difficulty in weighing policy alternatives
and in calculating costs and benefits. Courts have been shown to
be unable to gather and to absorb the sort of sufficient, objective
data required to make considered decisions when more than just
historical fact and causation are involved.
In addition to gathering and processing information, the executive branch has broader tools at its disposal to achieve foreign
policy goals. In the field of foreign affairs, the discretion and
authorities available to the President generally go beyond those
enjoyed by agencies in domestic affairs. The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its diplomatic relations, commander-inchief of the military, and director of the clandestine services. These
inherent authorities could be used in a variety of ways to achieve
foreign policy goals such as the promotion of international human
rights. In the diplomatic realm, they range from negotiating and
drafting international agreements to pressuring other nations to
follow human rights norms to seeking to isolate states with poor
human rights records. Intelligence agencies could take covert action to destabilize nations that abuse human rights or even capture
war criminals. As commander-in-chief, the President could issue
orders to the military to restore order in states where central
authority has collapsed, as in Somalia or Haiti, or ultimately to
use force to end human rights abuse by states, as in Kosovo, or
to produce regime change, as in Iraq.
The executive branch can also make significant progress toward
foreign policy goals without having to rely on inherent constitutional authority. 16 5 Under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), the President can impose sanctions
.64
Peter Schuck, Siting Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 394-404 (Yale,
1983); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 156-61 (Brookings, 1977).
,6' For an overview of the statutory law in the area of economics and national security,
see Harold Koh and John Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/DollarDefense: The Fabric of Economics
and National Security Law, 26 Intl Law 715 (1992).
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against entities ranging from individuals to nations."' If these
nations pose a threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy,
the President may declare a national emergency that then triggers
the authority to freeze foreign assets in the United States and to
restrict all commercial contacts with a foreign nation.16 7 Under
the Export Administration Act, the President can place restrictions
on exports to a nation that poses a threat to American national
security or foreign policy. 6 ' The President can deploy these powers as a scalpel or as a hammer. They can be used in a fine-grained
manner when aimed at a particular individual, such as apprehending Slobodan Milosevic. They can be used more broadly to
try to coerce a nation to change its treatment of its own citizens,
as with South Africa in the 1980s or with the former Yugoslavia
and Iraq in the 1990s.
In comparison, courts have few effective tools to enforce compliance with their decisions, and those tools use sanctions or the
punishment of individuals to leverage broader policy or institutional changes. Again drawing from the structural injunction context, courts possess imperfect tools for communicating their decrees, and they must rely upon other institutions and personnel
to disseminate and implement their orders. Courts have few resources to compel compliance on the part of defendants or to
create positive incentives to encourage adherence to judicial orders. Aside from a contempt order, judges generally rely upon the
moral persuasiveness and the institutional legitimacy of their decisions to encourage compliance. These problems are only compounded with regard to foreign affairs. Parties will often be outside
the United States and outside the reach of a federal district court
or federal marshals. In most ATS suits, for example, plaintiffs have
failed to collect any of the money they have been awarded by ATS
judgments.
Third, executive policy in foreign affairs is subject to greater
political accountability. One advantage of the courts, in certain
situations, is their relative insulation from political control. Delegation to courts may help preserve a legislative majority's vic50 USC § 1701 et seq.
67

1 Id at § 1702.
168Id at § 2401 et seq.
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tories by making them more difficult to reverse in the future,169
or provide a means to overcome a commitment problem. 170 Cost,
however, is the flip side of the benefit of locking in policies or
making a credible commitment. In order to achieve these ends,
Congress must accept a loss of flexibility in policy implementation,
a reduction in institutional expertise, and less ability to reflect
changing legislative wishes. Many of these arguments have been
brought to bear on the study of delegation of authority to agencies;
the primary insight is that bureaucracies can be "inefficient by
design" because of the desire of groups in the legislature to insulate
agencies that share their views from being overturned or influenced by later winning coalitions in the legislature.'7 1
As a matter of comparative institutional analysis, it would seem
that delegation to the courts would experience these costs and
benefits more intensely than delegation to executive branch agencies. Delegation of international law and human rights decisions
to courts would lock in policies such that only overriding legislation could change national goals. Compared to the executive
branch, courts are relatively impervious to oversight hearings, budget controls, and other informal political controls. They are also
less subject to the formal political control of elections. Except for
the long-term use of the appointment power of federal judges,
only a statute would allow the President and Congress to force a
change of direction in policy. While this gives courts greater political insulation, it also deprives them of the flexibility to adjust
policy in light of changes in preferences, new circumstances, or
new information and expertise.
Delegation to the executive branch, rather than the courts, in
the area of CIL and human rights also may make more sense
because of the President's enhanced constitutional role in foreign
affairs. As the sole representative of the nation in its international
relations, the President develops foreign policy, communicates
with other nations, and reaches international agreements. By custom, presidents also make a variety of informal commitments with
other nations. As commander-in-chief, the President can use force
169 See, for example, RuiJ. P. de Figueiredo,Jr., Electoral Competition, PoliticalUncertainty,
and Policy Insulation, 96 Am Pol Sci Rev 321 (2002).
170 Vesting a foreign affairs decision in the courts can provide the political branches with
a costly signal that they intend to abide by an international agreement.
171Id at 322-23 (discussing sources).
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to achieve foreign policy, but he can also make use of less violent
forms of persuasion or coercion as well. Human rights, of course,
have constituted an important element in American foreign policy.
Presidents have used human rights to undermine antagonistic regimes, as President Reagan did with the Soviet Union, or have
pursued them as a goal in themselves, as did President Carter.
Effectiveness would arguably be enhanced if the same institution
exercised control over international law and human rights as well
as broader foreign policy. Otherwise, the United States might send
conflicting signals to other nations about its policies. To take an
extreme case, suppose the United States sought to wage a war to
promote humanitarian goals, such as the end of a genocidal conflict. Such a war would arguably violate the prohibition on the
use of force contained in the U.N. Charter.'7 2 Indeed, the International Court of Justice has held that this rule is not just a positive
rule of the Charter, but a rule of CIL.'7 3 Suppose an alien harmed
by American military action in the war brought an ATS suit against
the U.S. government and its officials alleging the war violated
CIL. A judicial decision to promote CIL through the ATS could
conflict with the decision of the executive branch to use force in
the same case, to the point of even frustrating the substantive
improvement of human rights conditions in the area of conflict.
In light of these considerations, it seems that the executive
branch is superior to the courts for achieving the ATS's statutory
purpose. The executive branch has better means for developing
information on foreign affairs, has far more tools to bring to bear
against violators of human rights or international law, and can
display more flexibility in responding to changing international
conditions while remaining more accountable politically. Congress, however, might still delegate authority in these areas to the
courts rather than agencies depending on the propensity of the
executive branch to violate CIL itself. If the executive branch were
to prove more likely to violate CIL than the courts, then Congress
might choose to vest the authority for its enforcement in the latter.
Two considerations make it unlikely that this is the case. First,
the ATS currently does not operate to prevent the United States
.7 For a discussion of the international legal rules governing the use of force, see John
Yoo, Using Force, 71 U Chi L Rev 729 (2004).
171 Case Concerning Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. United States), 1986 ICJ 14, 146.

BEYOND FORMALISM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

199

from violating CIL because it does not override sovereign immunity. Second, even if Congress had chosen the ATS to provide
a means for the courts to control executive branch violations of
CIL, the courts' own doctrines permit the President to violate
CIL. The Paquete Habana itself recognizes that CIL may be overridden by a "controlling executive" action.17 4 This makes sense,
because in order to change CIL the President may need to violate
CIL-one of the ways to change a rule of CIL is to engage in
state practice that establishes a different rule.17 Presidents also
may need to violate CIL in order to vindicate other foreign policy
goals, such as using force to protect human rights (as in Kosovo)
or to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It
does not appear that Congress intends to limit the President's
flexibility in protecting national security or promoting foreign
policy goals by imposing CIL standards on his actions through
the ATS.
TV
Even if one agrees with our functional critique of the Sosa
Court's reading of the ATS, we would still have to offer an alternative reading of the statute that is consistent with both the
statutory text and with existing doctrine but which also incorporates our conclusions about the functional superiority of the
executive branch over the federal courts in the development of
CIL. Our functional analysis supports reading the ATS as a jurisdictional statute that does not authorize federal courts to engage
in the development and enforcement of any kind of CIL as part
of their common lawmaking powers. As a doctrinal matter, however, we recognize that many courts, including the Sosa Court,
follow The Paquete Habana'sdeclaration that "international law is
part of our law" and must exist in some part of the domestic legal
system cognizable by courts even when Congress has not acted to
implement such norms by statute.
For this reason, in addition to reading the ATS as a pure jurisdictional statute providing a basis for subsequent congressional
' The Paquete Habana, 175 US at 712.
,71See, for example, Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override Customary
or Other InternationalLaw in the Course of ExtraterritorialLaw Enforcement Activities, 13
Op Office Legal Counsel 163, 170-71 (1989) (discussing whether Congress and the executive can override CIL).
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implementation of CIL, our functional analysis suggests that modern CIL should be treated like the rest of the pre-Erie general
common law: as part of the common law of the states. As we
explain, unlike the federal common law approach adopted by the
Sosa Court, treating uncodified CIL as state common law will
result in active participation by the institution best positioned to
assess and enforce CIL: the federal executive.
A.

THE JURISDICTIONAL READING OF THE ATS

Our jurisdictional reading is at least as consistent with the text,
structure, and history of the ATS as the Sosa Court's quasi-jurisdictional reading, if not more so. Indeed, the Sosa Court admitted
as much when it also concluded that the ATS's text and structure
did not create a statutory cause of action. But the Sosa Court
nonetheless decided to keep the door "ajar" for federal court development and enforcement of certain universally accepted norms
of CIL. Neither the Sosa Court, nor its academic supporters, have
offered a functional justification for giving federal courts a central
role in the development and enforcement of CIL. This is perhaps
not surprising because a functional analysis of the institutional
consequences of the Sosa Court's reading of the ATS leads us to
conclude that federal courts are not the best positioned institution
to develop and enforce CIL. Rather, a functional analysis supports
a jurisdictional reading of the ATS that leaves CIL enforcement
either to Congress or to the common law of the several states.
Ironically, the perceived functional implausibility of the jurisdictional reading of the ATS has been one of the chief arguments
for maintaining the federal status of CIL endorsed by Sosa. As
Dean Koh has argued, treating CIL as state law could result in
fifty different state interpretations of CIL and would be inconsistent with the traditional "one voice" conception of U.S. foreign
relations law.'7 6 Moreover, treating CIL as state common law appears on its face to resemble the Sosa Court's reading in preserving
a role for functionally inferior courts in the development and enforcement of CIL.
We agree that these are serious objections to the reading of the
ATS we propose here. Indeed, they are the only objections that
have any force. These objections, however, can both be answered
176

See Koh, 111 Harv L Rev at 1824, 1841 (cited in note 114).
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by recognizing the power of the President to supervise and independently preempt divergent interpretations of CIL. Thus,
reading the ATS as a jurisdictional statute only and removing CIL
from the federal courts' common lawmaking powers does not leave
CIL to the whims of fifty different state court systems that might
be even less functionally competent than the federal judiciary.
Rather, our jurisdictional reading of the ATS places CIL in the
state and federal courts under the direct supervision of the federal
executive.
Although the Sosa Court also contemplates a role for the executive branch, its suggestion that "in appropriate cases" the executive branch's views be given "strong deference" still assumes
that federal courts, rather than the executive branch, will hold the
final determination on how and whether to apply a CIL norm.' 77
Indeed, as we explain below, under the Sosa Court's implicit recognition of CIL as federal law, giving the executive the final word
would threaten federal judicial independence. This problem does
not, however, arise if CIL is treated as a type of state common
law.
Thus, unlike the Sosa Court's reading of the ATS, the institution
most responsible for the development and enforcement of CIL
under our reading of the ATS will be the federal executive. As we
have explained, the executive has substantial institutional advantages over courts in the development and enforcement of CIL. In
the next two sections, we demonstrate that, in addition to the
functional advantages of relying on executive supervision of CIL
that we identified in Part II, treating CIL as state common law
with active presidential supervision is also well grounded as a matrecent
ter of historical practice and strengthened by the Court's
78
Garamendi.'
v
Association
Insurance
decision in American
B.

STATE COURTS AND CIL

As the Sosa Court pointed out, the Supreme Court has long
"affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes
the law of nations."'179 But the Sosa Court failed to acknowledge
that, prior to Filartiga,this affirmation of CIL has been as much
"'7 Sosa, 124 S Ct at n 21.
171123 S Ct 2374 (2003).
17 Id at 2764.
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the task of state courts operating independently and without the
supervision of the federal courts.
1. CIL as general common law. Prior to the seminal case of Erie,
most scholars agree that CIL formed part of the general common
law.1" ° In contrast to the post-Erie system, federal courts were not
bound by state court interpretations of general common law and
state courts were not bound by federal court interpretations of
general common law. Thus, when cases involving the application
of CIL fell within the jurisdiction of state courts, those courts
applied CIL independently without the possibility of appeal to the
federal courts or the Supreme Court. Similarly, federal courts applied CIL without being bound by state court interpretations.
Each system, therefore, applied CIL independently of the other. 1 '
The Supreme Court consistently confirmed this understanding
of the pre-Erie status of CIL, holding that CIL "is one of those
questions of general jurisprudence" or general common law.'82 On
a number of occasions, the Court also confirmed that it had no
appellate jurisdiction over state court interpretations and applications of CIL. Thus, in 1875, the Court refused to accept appellate jurisdiction over a state court decision applying the "general laws of war, as recognized by the law of nations" because such
a case did not involve the "Constitution, laws, treaties, or executive
proclamations of the United States" under the contemporary version of today's federal question jurisdiction statute. 83
Less than a decade later, the Court similarly refused to review a
state court decision affirming the legality of an abduction of a criminal
defendant overseas in violation of CIL because "the decision of that
question is as much within the province of the state court as a question
of common law, or of the law of nations . . . . "' Although some
commentators have simply rejected these and other decisions reach"' See, for example, Restatement (Third), pt I, ch 2, introductory note at 41; Young,
42 Va J Intl L at 365, 374 (cited in note 50); Neuman, 66 Fordham L Rev at 373 (cited
in note 36); Stephens, 66 Fordham L Rev at 400 and n 34 (cited in note 36); see also
Sosa, 124 S Ct at 2770.
...
For the leading account of the operation of the general common law system, and its
difference from the modern, positivistic understanding of federal and state common law,
see William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv L Rev 1513 (1984).
..
2 Huntington v Atrill, 146 US 657, 683 (1892).
"83See New York Life Insurance v Hendren, 92 US 286 (1875).
'14
Ker, 119 US at 444 (cited in note 60).
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ing the same result as wrongly decided, 8 ' the fact remains that no
Supreme Court decision in the pre-Erie regime ever held that the
state court
interpretations of CIL could be reviewed by federal
6
18

courts.

After Erie, some courts followed the logic of Erie's holding and
treated CIL as a form of state common law. In 1948,Judge Learned
Hand interpreted CIL to grant diplomatic immunity from civil suit
to a French diplomat accredited as a minister to Bolivia. Applying
Erie, Hand held that the suit was governed by the law of New York,
"and although the courts of that state look to international law as
a source of New York law, their interpretation of international law
is controlling upon us, and we are to follow them so far as they
' Judge Hand then surveyed both New
have declared themselves."187
York state court cases and general international law authorities to
resolve the case in favor of the foreign diplomat.
2. Case study in CIL development: foreign sovereign immunity. A
review of one particular doctrine of CIL, foreign sovereign immunity, illustrates two important practical aspects of the CIL-asgeneral-common-law system relevant to our jurisdictional reading
of the ATS. First, state courts, both before and after Erie, interpreted
the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity independently of federal
courts, even in matters directly implicating foreign relations, by
adjudicating sensitive litigations against foreign sovereigns. Second,
the executive branch, rather than federal courts, served as the chief
mechanism for deciding how to deal with the sensitive foreign policy
implications of such cases. 8'
Although the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity for foreign
governments was first announced in the United States by Chief
Justice Marshall in 1812,'89 this doctrine of CIL was independently
"'5See Neuman, 66 Fordham L Rev at 374 n 14 (cited in note 36); Restatement (Third)
§ 111 n 4.
116 Indeed, one of the interesting aspects of the scholarly debate is that while there is
virtually no judicial precedent prior to Filartigasupporting federal court control over the
interpretation and application of CIL, leading scholars managed to achieve wide acceptance
for this view. See, for example, Restatement (Third) § 111. This consensus was achieved
despite the fact that the only federal court to directly consider the question of CIL after
Erie prior to Filartiga,Judge Learned Hand in the Second Circuit, essentially followed
Erie and past practice and treated CIL as part of New York's common law. See Bergman
v De Sieyes, 170 F2d 360 (2d Cir 1948).
"'Bergman, 170 F2d at 361 (cited in note 186).
"' For a longer and more detailed review of the pre-Erie system's treatment of CIL,
see Julian G. Ku, Customary InternationalLaw in State Courts, 42 Va J Intl L 265 (2001).
9Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, 11 US 116 (1812).
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developed by both state and federal courts. As early as 1857, the
Supreme Court of New York began modifying the absolute theory
of immunity outlined by Marshall by refusing to dismiss the government of Nicaragua from being joined to lawsuit on the grounds
that "joinder" was not "necessarily derogatory to the character or
independence of a state. .. .""0 Much later, a New Jersey court
expanded this modification of strict absolute immunity by outlining
a restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity limited to those
"acts done under color of the authority conferred upon it," and not
"in excess of that authority and without legal justification."19 '
One interesting example of how states and federal courts operated
independently in the development of this CIL doctrine may be seen
in judicial development of the foreign sovereign immunity waiver
doctrine. In 1922, a complicated litigation involving a state-owned
Portuguese company proceeded simultaneously in New York state
and federal courts. Curiously, while the New York state court found
that the company, which claimed sovereign immunity, had not
waived this immunity by answering the U.S. plaintiffs' complaints
on the merits, the Second Circuit reached the exact opposite conclusion twelve days later in the federal side of the action. 19 2 Plaintiffs
then returned to the New York state court seeking reversal, but the
New York state court simply refused to follow the Second Circuit's
interpretation of CIL.' 93 The New York state court thus rejected
the Second Circuit's interpretation of CIL as applied to the exact
same set of facts.
The possibility that federal and state courts could reach inconsistent results, even in cases involving the same facts, highlights the
major flaw in the pre-Erie system of CIL. Because CIL was part of
the general common law, there was no basis for seeking federal or
Supreme Court action to unify the interpretation or application of
CIL, even doctrines such as foreign sovereign immunity that directly implicated foreign sovereign interests. Unlike the modern
position endorsed by the Sosa Court's reading of the ATS, the Supreme Court could not overrule state court interpretations of CIL.
On the other hand, the pre-Erie system did have a mechanism
9' Manning v Nicaragua & Accessory Transit Co., 14 How Pr 517 (New York, 1857).
Pliger v United States Steel Corp., 130 A 523 (NJ 1925).
...
9' De Simone v TransportesMaritimos De Estado, 191 NYS 864, 867 (App Div 1922); The
Sao Vicente, 281 F 111, 114 (2d Cir 1922).
'9' De Simone v Transportes Maritimos de Estado, 192 NYS 815, 181-19 (App Div 1922).
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for handling the sensitive foreign policy consequences of cases that
involved foreign sovereigns: the federal executive branch. For instance, the executive, through an appearance amicus curiae by a
United States Attorney, convinced a New York state court to grant
Mexico sovereign immunity in a lawsuit seeking remedies for an
alleged default of its sovereign bonds.' 94 This practice continued
two decades later in a subsequent litigation over a later Mexico
default of a different set of sovereign bonds. A U.S. attorney appeared in New York state court on behalf of Mexico to advocate
giving Mexican assets immunity from seizure by bondholders. 9 '
While some courts hesitated to require absolute deferral to the
President, the Supreme Court eventually recognized the executive's
final authority on determinations of sovereign immunity in 1945.196
Thus, "if the Executive announced a national policy in regard to
immunity generally, or for the particular case, that policy was law
for the courts and binding upon them, regardless of what international law might say about it."' 97
As a result, the executive, rather than federal courts, served as
the institution responsible for assessing the effect of a court's application of the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity on U.S. foreign
policy and, perhaps, the content of CIL itself. During this period,
the executive branch would receive petitions from foreign governments, hold administrative hearings, and then issue letters to courts
stating the position of the U.S. government on a foreign government's sovereign immunity request.'9 8 While some have argued that
the President cannot determine CIL for the courts and can only
order courts to disregard CIL,'99 for our purposes this is a distinction without a difference. Under either view, the executive, and not
19 4 Hassardv Mexico, 61 NY 939 (1899).
'9sGallopin v Winsor, 251 NY 48 (1931).
116Mexico v Hoffman, 324 US 30 (1945). Curiously, despite the holding in this case
requiring courts to defer to the executive branch's views, the State Department continued
to claim that "a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts ...."See Letter
from Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to Department of Justice, May 19, 1952, 26 Dept
State Bull 984 (1952).
"' See, for example, Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 56 (Oxford,
1996).
'9'
For a description of this quasi-administrative process, see Frederic Alan Weber, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 Yale Stud World
Pub Order 1, 12-13 (1976).
'99
See id at 56 n 68.

206

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2004

the federal courts, has the final word on how to resolve an issue of
CIL for purposes of U.S. domestic law.
Interestingly, this practice of executive control over the application of foreign sovereign immunity was applied to both state and
federal courts even after Erie supposedly unified (at least in the view
of the Sosa Court) federal court control over CIL. Thus, in 1940,
a New York court refused to give immunity to a Polish state-owned
bank after noting the executive branch's refusal to appear in court."0
In 1941, Maine's highest court granted such immunity solely on
the basis of the executive's appearance in its court.2 ' As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in 1945:
When the Department of State makes known its determination
with respect to political matters growing out of or incidental to
our Government's relations with a friendly foreign state, it is
the duty of the courts to abide by the status so indicated or
created and to refrain from making independent inquiries into
the merit of the State Department's determination or from taking any steps that might prove embarrassing to the Government
in the handling of its foreign relations.0 2
This executive lawmaking regime continued until 1975, when Congress intervened to codify the law of foreign sovereign immunity
as federal statutory law.20 3
Congress's intervention changed the role of the executive branch
in the oversight of the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity but it
did not eliminate it. Questions of sovereign immunity for heads of
state and former heads of state remained uncodified and continued
to be tightly supervised by the executive. 2" As for the areas of
foreign sovereign immunity that Congress did codify, Congress did
not act due to any doubts about the executive's authority to engage
in this kind of lawmaking. Instead, it acted, among other reasons,
"in order to free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic
pressures.""2 5 For our purposes, it is worth noting that when the
200 Ulen & Co. v Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowegao, 24 NYS2d 201 (App Div 1940).
2"'Miller v GerrocarrillDel Pacificio de Nicaragua, 18 A2d 688, 690 (Me 1941).

2' FWStone v Petroleous Mexicanos, 42 A2d 57, 59-60 (Pa 1945).
203Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC §§ 1330, 1602-11.
21 See, for example, United States v Noriega, 117 F3d 126 (11th Cir 1997) (rejecting
sovereign immunity for Panamanian leader on grounds that executive branch "has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied head-of-state immunity.").
205 Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 488 (1983).

BEYOND FORMALISM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

207

executive administration of the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity
proved imperfect, Congress did not simply return such determinations to the common law powers of the courts, which it might
well have done if the federal courts had the kind of central role in
the administration of CIL contemplated by the Filartigaand Sosa
courts. Rather, it created "a comprehensive set of legal standards
governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign
20 6
state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities
that placed the federal courts under strict statutory limitations. Indeed, subsequent courts later understood Congress' action to require courts to adhere to Congress' legal standards, even if such
changing notions of
standards differed or came into conflict 20with
7
the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity.
C.

EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION OF CIL: THE GARAMENDI OPTION

While the pre-Erieregime of CIL as general common law persisted for a substantial period of time, in some cases the system
resulted in inconsistent interpretations or applications of CIL.
Such inconsistencies have fueled critics ofJudge Hand's suggestion
that CIL has become part of the common law of the several states
after Erie. After all, adopting Judge Hand's view would result in
fifty different interpretations of CIL doctrines such as foreign
sovereign immunity with chaotic implications for the ability of
the United States to maintain a unified voice on foreign affairs. 0 8
As the practice of state courts with respect to foreign sovereign
immunity recounted above suggests, however, there is no reason
to believe that granting federal courts broad authority over CIL
development, as the Court did in Sosa, will result in a superior
system. Indeed, as we have pointed out, federal courts suffer from
many disabilities that make them less than ideal arbiters of CIL,
especially in matters implicating sensitive issues of foreign relations. Rather, we believe both the historical record and functional
considerations support reading the ATS as merely jurisdictional,
thus leaving to the executive branch, rather than the federal courts,
the power to supervise CIL development as a matter of domestic
206

Id.

2"Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 US 428 (1989) (holding that
Congress did not authorize federal courts to interpret Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
to exempt any violations of international law that Congress did not specifically identify).
2

. Koh, 111 Harv L Rev at 1841 (cited in note 114).
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law. The Supreme Court's recent decision in American Insurance
Association v Garamendi °9 confirms and strengthens this belief.
1. Garamendi.In Garamendi, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act
(HVIRA), a California statute requiring insurance companies to
disclose information about World War II-era insurance policies
held by Holocaust victims.2 1 ° An association of insurance companies, including foreign insurance companies who bore the brunt
of the disclosure requirements, challenged HVIRA on the grounds
that the state law impermissibly intruded into the federal government's exclusive authority over foreign affairs. The United States
government, as well as the German government, filed briefs in
support of the insurance companies. By a 5-4 majority, the Court
agreed that the state law was preempted."
What makes Garamendiimportant for our purposes is not that
the Court decided to preempt a state law, but the basis for the
supposed preemption. A trial court had invalidated HVIRA on the
grounds that it interfered with the federal government's exclusive
control over foreign affairs.212 The trial court had relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v Miller,"3 which authorized federal courts to preempt state laws that intruded into foreign
affairs even without a direct conflict with a federal statute, treaty,
or executive agreement. 1 4 Zschernig's conception of a "dormant
foreign affairs preemption" power for federal courts had been
sharply criticized by commentators and sparingly applied by
courts. 15
The Garamendi Court did not reject Zschernig. On the other
hand, it also did not extend Zschernig's endorsement of an independent federal court power to supervise foreign relations. Instead,
539 US 396 (2003) (cited in note 64).
See Cal Ins Code §§ 13800-07.
21 539 US 396.
212 See, for example, Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v Quackenbush, 2000 US
Dist LEXIS 8815 (June 9, 2000).
2 389 US 429 (1968).
214 Gerling Global, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 8815, *19.
(noting that
215 See, for example, Gerling Global v Low, 240 F3d 739 (9th Cir 2001)
Zschernig has been applied sparingly). For critical commentary, see Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, ForeignAffairs, and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617, 1643-58 (1997); Michael
D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understandingof Foreign
Policy Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 341 (1999).
209
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the Court found the California law preempted because the law
created a clear conflict with a "consistent Presidential foreign policy.7216 Importantly, the Court did not rely on a treaty, statute, or
executive agreement to find preemption. Rather, it gleaned this
"consistent Presidential foreign policy" by reviewing statements
made by U.S. officials responsible for negotiating settlement
agreements with foreign governments and insurers. 217 Because
these statements by executive branch officials indicated a national
policy to encourage voluntary repayment of insurance policies
rather than mandatory disclosures, "state law must give way where,
as here, there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies
adopted" by the "federal executive authority" and the states.218
Thus, the Garamendi Court neatly sidestepped the main criticism of Zschernig, which attacked Zschernig's empowerment of federal courts to preempt independently state laws in the complete
absence of any input from (or indeed in opposition to) the wishes
of the President or Congress. By relying on executive "statements"
of national policy, the Garamendi Court avoided the problem of
unchecked federal courts by empowering the executive branch to
settle future disputes over state interference with foreign affairs
by issuing statements of national policy.
As Justice Ginsburg argued in her dissent, the Court's reliance
on statements by individual members of the executive branch
"places the considerable power of foreign affairs preemption in
the hands of individual sub-Cabinet members of the Executive
Branch."2" 9 Even if the officials faithfully represented the executive's policy, the dissent argued that the decision might result in
giving such officials "the power to invalidate a state law simply by
conveying the Executive's views on matters of federal policy."22
2. Garamendi and CIL. Although the decision did not involve
state court interpretations of CIL, Garamendimatters because the
power of the federal courts to independently oversee state activities
in foreign affairs is deeply intertwined with federal courts' powers
over the development of CIL. As suggested above, supporters of
the Sosa Court's reading of the ATS have argued that control over
216Garamendi, 539

217Id.
218Id.
2 " Id at
220

Id.

442.

US 396, 399-400.
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CIL must remain under the authority of the federal courts because
only federal courts can unify disparate and inconsistent interpretations of CIL.22 1 In this view, CIL is simply one part of the larger
foreign relations law controlled and developed by federal courts.
Just as states cannot intrude on matters involving foreign relations
by enacting laws like HVIRA, states cannot be allowed to intrude
on foreign relations by developing and interpreting CIL independently.
Although Garamendimight be understood as a defeat for "foreign relations federalism" and state participation in matters relating to foreign affairs,222 it is hardly an unqualified endorsement
of Zschernig's reliance on federal courts to police state activities.
Rather, Garamendi's reliance on the statements and actions of executive branch officials to discern a "consistent Presidential foreign policy" in conflict with the state law affirms that the federal
executive, rather than the federal courts, holds the primary responsibility for determining which state laws and policies unduly interfere with national policies.
This reliance on the executive to oversee the states on matters
implicating foreign affairs is hardly radical. Nor is this authority
limited to executive supervision of state activities that offend foreign governments such as HVIRA. If anything, the tradition of
executive supervision of states is stronger and deeper in the context
of the development of CIL. As explained above, the federal executive has long exercised the right to intervene in lower state and
federal court decisions implicating the CIL of foreign sovereign
immunity.
Thus, while federal and state courts differed on the application
of the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity, the federal executive's
statements were treated as authoritative. Nor was this executive
power limited to the question of recognizing governments. Thus,
for example, the executive's independent decision to recognize a
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity in the famous
State Department Tate Letter223 was followed by courts, including
221 See,
222 For

for example, Koh, 111 Harv L Rev 1824, 1841 (cited in note 114).
the most prominent academic defenders, see Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev at 1643-58

(cited in note 215); Ramsey, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 341 (cited in note 215); PeterJ. Spiro,
Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U Colo L Rev 1223 (1999).
223 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser for the State Department, 26 Dept
State Bull 984 (1952).
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the Supreme Court, even though this interpretation of CIL did
not directly implicate the recognition of any particular foreign
government.22 4 Moreover, despite Justice Ginsburg's criticism of
the Garamendi Court's reliance on "statements by sub-Cabinet
officers,"2 2 the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity has long been
controlled by actions (such as the Tate Letter) of sub-Cabinet
officers in the State Department's Legal Advisor's office or the
Department of Justice.2 26
For this reason, Garamendi only serves to strengthen the executive's already well-established role in the supervision of CIL.
Garamendi's preference for using statements by sub-Cabinet officials to determine whether a state law conflicts with national
policy reaffirms the ability of such officials to control the development of CIL in lower courts as well. Garamendireminds us that
the federal court-centered system endorsed by Sosa is not the only
system capable of providing a coherent national approach to the
development of CIL. Indeed, given our functional analysis of federal courts, the system endorsed by Sosa is not even the best system
for achieving uniformity in the development of CIL.
Under this understanding of Garamendiand consistent with past
practice, the President controls CIL in three different ways.
The President has the authority to declare, on behalf of the
United States, adherence, rejection, or interpretations of CIL
on the international plane. Most CIL requires state consent
and most scholars agree that the President holds the primary
authority to issue or withhold such consent for the United
States. One of the more uncontroversial examples of this practice is President Truman's 1945 proclamation declaring that
the United States would subject the underwater continental
shelf abutting the coasts of the U.S. as part of U.S. territory.22 7
A more controversial example of this practice is President
224 See, for example, Isbrandtsen Tankers v President of India, 446 F2d 1198 (2d Cir 1971)
(following Tate Letter).
225Garamendi, 539 US at 442 (cited in note 64).
226 The executive's practice with regard to foreign sovereign immunity was somewhat
controversial in the academy but it persisted without much controversy in the courts until
Congress's codification in 1975. See, for example, Philip C. Jessup, Has the Supreme Court
Abdicated One of Its Functions? 40 Am J Intl L 168 (1946).
227 Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation 2667, Sept 28, 1945, 10
Fed Reg 12303 (1945).
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Bush's 2001 determination that al Qaeda and Taliban detainto the full proees captured in Afghanistan are not subject
228
tections of the customary laws of war.
" The President may declare a national policy to adhere, reject
or interpret a principle of CIL that preempts the entire field
of CIL from state common law development. For example, in
the aforementioned laws-of-war example, any presidential determination on the limited rights of unlawful combatants under the laws of war would likely completely preempt any independent state adjudication of CIL of those rights, including
lawsuits by such individuals seeking to challenge the President's interpretation. Thus, if an unlawful combatant (say
from Guantanamo Bay) sues for violations of the law of war,
the whole field would be controlled by presidential determinations of the applicability of the CIL of war to such combatants.2 29
" The President may declare a national policy to accept, reject,
or interpret a principle of CIL that comes into conflict with
a specific interpretation of CIL under a state's common law.
If a state adopts an interpretation of CIL, for instance, that
foreign sovereign immunity protects a particular head of state,
the President can override that particular interpretation while
still leaving the state the authority to interpret other related
forms of CIL such as whether head-of-state immunity applies
to former heads of state.23 °
Both the majority and the dissent in Garamendi accepted an independent role for the executive in the preemption of state activity.
Instead, the dispute centered on the exact form of executive intervention, with the dissent demanding a "formal" authoritative
act by the President himself while the majority was content to rely
upon statements made by sub-Cabinet officers as long as those
statements accurately expressed the conflict between state and national policy.23 ' For our purposes, we believe the President and
his subordinates are authorized to use a variety of legal mechaSee, for example, John Yoo and James Ho, The Status of Terrorists,44 Va J Intl L 207
(2003).
229 This would not prevent such an individual from bringing a suit on other grounds,
however, including violations of constitutional or other domestic law rights.
230Compare Republic of Austria v Altmann, 124 S Ct 2240, 2254 (2004).
228
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nisms to express national policy ranging from presidential declarations to Tate-Letter-like statements by sub-Cabinet officials to
statements of interests filed in the context of particular litigations.
As long as there is no dispute within the executive branch as to
what the national policy requires with respect to CIL, we believe
any of the above mechanisms will suffice.
Of course, the President's authority to issue such declarations
or interpretations is not exclusive. Rather, it is subject to congressional override for matters falling within the shared powers
of Congress and the President. In the absence of congressional
intervention, however, the President's interpretation of CIL would
be the final word.232
Our proposal results in a substantially different role for the
executive than the Sosa Court envisions. While the Sosa Court
noted that "there is a strong argument to give serious weight" 2"
to executive branch views of the impact of an ATS suit on foreign
policy, it did not issue the same kind of absolute rule of deference
to executive determinations that it required in the context of foreign sovereign immunity. Indeed, despite paying lip service to the
importance of leaving much control over CIL to the political
branches, the Sosa Court showed surprisingly little regard for the
opinions of either the President or the Senate in its resolution of
the Sosa case itself.
For instance, while conceding that the political branches of the
U.S. government had, through its non-self-execution declarations,
refused to give judicial effect to treaty norms prohibiting arbitrary
detention, it nonetheless conducted its own independent analysis
of the CIL issues raised by Sosa. It not only failed to give any
deference to the executive branch's views on the subject, but it
did not consider the Senate's decision to make such norms nonself-executing as a limitation on its ability to revive such a norm
through the common lawmaking process.2 34
Under the reading of the ATS we have suggested, the question
of whether Alvarez-Machain's abduction violated CIL would be a
232 We limit our argument to the President's ability to interpret CIL in absence of
congressional action and do not address the related, but distinct question of the President's
authority to interpret treaties. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see John C. Yoo,
Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 Cal L Rev 1305 (2002), and
Michael P. Van Alstine, The JudicialPower and Treaty Delegation, 90 Cal L Rev 1263 (2002).
233Sosa, 124 S Ct at 2767.
234See, for example, id at 2768-69.
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matter of state common law. If the executive intervened in the
same or similar manner that it did in Alvarez-Machain, the court
hearing the case would give absolute deference to the executive's
determination as a matter of national policy, assuming of course
that Congress (or the treaty makers) have not codified this particular CIL norm by treaty or federal statute.
D.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

While Garamendi provides doctrinal support for our proposal
for state court control over CIL (supervised by the federal executive), critics are likely to offer a number of objections. We consider each in turn.
1. The inadequacy of state courts. Perhaps the most counterintuitive component of our jurisdictional reading of the ATS is the
idea that CIL will form part of the common law of the states
rather than federal law. As proponents of the modern position
have argued, CIL seems to logically fall within the purview of the
federal government because foreign affairs is clearly a national
rather than a state matter. Moreover, as we have pointed out in
our functional analysis of the ATS, CIL needs to be unified.
The first response, of course, is that under our proposal CIL
would form part of the common law of the states but it will be
the President that is responsible for unifying the treatment of CIL
for the United States as a whole. As we have explained in Part III,
the executive branch has many more resources at its disposal for
assessing and interpreting CIL. Unlike federal courts, which rely
on private litigants to remove cases to its jurisdiction and private
litigants to properly brief the issue before it, the executive branch
can intervene wherever and whenever it chooses to by the simple
expediency of issuing a document similar to the Tate Letter. If
diplomatic or administrative pressures prove too burdensome, the
executive can seek congressional codification of the substantive
CIL standards it has adopted as it did in the case of foreign sovereign immunity.
Moreover, even if one accepted the idea that state governments
have no role in the administration and interpretation of CIL, an
idea one of us has disputed at length elsewhere,23 our proposal
23

Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with
InternationalLaw, 82 NC L Rev 457 (2004).
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will almost certainly result in most CIL litigation returning to
federal courts. The difference will be that such litigation must
satisfy federal diversity jurisdiction requirements and will be governed by the common law of the state where the federal court
resides. Thus, even if state courts and institutions were deemed
somehow inferior, as a functional matter, to federal courts, our
proposal does not preclude plaintiffs from going to federal courts
anyway (assuming they can satisfy diversity requirements).
Additionally, treating CIL as state common law helps to avoid
conflicts between courts and the executive over control of the
interpretation of federal law. Under the current system, if the
executive seeks to stop a court from adhering to a principle of
CIL, a court empowered by the Sosa decision to interpret CIL
might reject the President's views on a question of CIL on the
grounds that the court's power to independently interpret federal
law is being threatened. For instance, some courts have resisted
analogous efforts by the executive to require courts to defer to
the executive's interpretation of a treaty, suggesting that if "[t]he
Government equates deference to submission," then it "would
conflate" giving the executive's views deference "with surrendered
' Presumably, courts might raise similar
judicial independence."2 36
concerns in the context of executive views on CIL if such views
were absolutely binding on federal courts.
Such concerns may be misguided, especially in the context of
treaty interpretation.23 7 Even so, this continuing tension between
judicial independence and executive competence could be largely
avoided if state (or federal courts sitting in diversity) are merely
applying CIL as a doctrine of state common law. Absolute deference by state or federal courts to executive statements of CIL
would not threaten the separation of powers since courts still retain
their judicial power over federal law. Moreover, the Court's own
precedents consistently permit greater presidential leeway over
state law as opposed to the other branches of the federal government. As Garamendiillustrates, the Court has determined that the
President, who holds the "vast share of responsibility for foreign
affairs," already has the unilateral ability to preempt state law based
on his determination of a "clear conflict" with a "consistent na236

Tachiona v Mugabe, 186 F Supp 2d 383 (SDNY 2002).
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tional policy. ' 238 And as we have explained above, this doctrinal
result has sound functional benefits given the President's numerous institutional advantages over federal courts in the determination of national policy toward CIL and international human
rights law. Just as importantly, it also helps to preserve the role
of federal courts as fair institutions relatively independent of political manipulation.
2. The dangers ofpresidentialauthority over CIL. The second main
objection to our jurisdictional reading of the ATS is that it would
confer too much power on the President with respect to the interpretation and application of CIL. It is true that our proposal
gives the President the discretion to interpret, apply, and even
violate CIL. But we do not find this objection problematic for the
following reasons.
First, it is well settled that the United States, as a sovereign,
has the authority to violate CIL. U.S. courts, for instance, have
long recognized that Congress has the power to violate treaties
and CIL for purposes of domestic law. Hence, courts will enforce
statutes passed later in time even if they conflict with treaties, and
courts will also enforce statutes that violate CIL (although they
will try to interpret both to avoid conflict).239 Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that even though international law
is "part of our law," it is subject to preemption by a "controlling
executive act.""

Second, the President is the best-positioned institution to determine whether and how the United States as a whole should
adhere to a particular rule or interpretation of CIL. As we have
explained, much of CIL is determined by state practice and, under
the U.S. system, the President is the chief interlocutor with foreign

nations and international institutions. As such, the President is
well positioned to assess various possible interpretations of CIL
and harmonize those interpretations with the foreign policy goals
of the United States. The President can also assess the continuing

validity of a previously accepted CIL rule given changed foreign
238 Garamendi, 539 US at 399-400.
219Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190 (1888); Murray v The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
US 64 (1804). For a discussion of the issues raised by conflicts between treaties and federal
statutes, see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last in Time Rule for Treaties
and FederalStatutes, 80 Ind L J (forthcoming Winter 2005).
240 The Paquete Habana, 175 US at 712.
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policy circumstances or changes in state practice. Moreover, the
question from a functional perspective is not whether the President
is likely to incorrectly interpret or violate CIL. The proper question is whether the President is better positioned than federal
courts in determining how and whether to apply a rule of CIL.
As we have argued, federal courts have few if any institutional
advantages in the interpretation and enforcement of CIL, especially in the harmonization of CIL rules with the broader foreign
policy goals which they have no ability to assess. Notably, neither
the Sosa Court nor other defenders of the modern position have
offered a defense of federal court control over CIL on anything
other than formal grounds.
Third, under our view, Congress has the authority to override
most presidential interpretations of CIL as well as presidential
decisions to violate CIL. After all, Congress has the power to
"define and punish offences against the Law of Nations. 24' 1 Moreover, it has been delegated a number of specific powers to regulate
foreign commerce and the military.24 2 While there are some matters allocated by the Constitution to the President exclusively,
many CIL questions do not fall within that category and can be
regulated by Congress if it chooses. Additionally, as we explained
above, Congress exercises substantially more influence over the
executive branch than it does over the courts because it does not
have to rely solely on its legislative power to override a decision.
It can hold oversight hearings, change budget allocations, and
block the appointment of executive officers, to name just a few of
these nonlegislative mechanisms that would enable it to oversee
executive interpretations of CIL. If Congress chooses not to act,
either formally or informally, we believe the President rather than
the federal courts should retain the authority to determine U.S.
policy toward CIL.
3. The end of foreign relationsfederalism? Finally, our proposal
will likely be criticized, in the same way that Garamendihas already
been attacked, for transferring excessive authority to the President
at the expense of the states.243 Professors Denning and Ramsey
have recently argued, for instance, that principles of federalism
21 US Const, Art I, § 8.
242Id.
243 Brannon P. Denning and Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 325 (2005).
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and separation of powers require formal preemption by the statute
or treaty over state activities implicating foreign affairs. Indeed,
the expansive nature of modern CIL encompassing traditionally
state law areas such as family and criminal law might allow a
President to wield CIL aggressively to unilaterally override state
policies. 45 While we are more sympathetic to these objections
than the others we have addressed, we nonetheless find them unconvincing.
It is true that states have historically interpreted CIL as part of
their common law, but such interpretations or applications of CIL
have never been considered strong candidates for protection under
principles of federalism. For instance, state interpretation of the
CIL respecting foreign sovereign immunity may implicate some
traditional state interests, but very weak ones, if at all. This is
probably why states welcomed executive interventions in this area
of CIL. Their interest in maintaining an independent interpretation of the CIL of human rights is probably just as weak given
that they have legislative authority to guarantee many of the same
substantive results without relying on CIL. Thus, allowing the
President to override state judicial interpretations of CIL or state
statutes purporting to implement CIL will be unlikely to threaten
basic state autonomy since the states could simply accomplish the
same goals through other means. It is also worth pointing out that
under our view, Congress will have the power to repeal the President's actions against the states because presidential determinations of the effect of CIL on state law fall squarely within Congress's traditional powers to define CIL.
The most difficult case occurs when existing non-CIL state law
comes into conflict with CIL. For instance, the juvenile death
penalty as administered by the states may violate CIL.246 Under
our view, however, the President cannot exercise his CIL interpretive power over the states unless the state is explicitly interpreting CIL. In other words, unless the state adopts an interpretation of CIL that permits such executions, there is no basis for
the President to intervene. Even if a criminal defendant raises an
argument based upon CIL in order to challenge his sentence, the
244Id.
245
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246See, for example, William A. Schabas, Is the United States Death Penalty System In-
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President could not necessarily exercise the Garamendi power to
preempt the state's death sentence. If the state is merely applying
its non-CIL statutory or common law on a matter within its traditional legislative competence, a presidential intervention might
not satisfy Garamendi's requirement of balancing among the national policy interest, the strength of the state's interest, and the
clarity of the conflict.
To be sure, the Garamendiframework counsels deference to the
executive branch and undoubtedly strengthens the President's
ability to wield CIL against the states. Even so, the proper question
for supporters of federalism is whether the President is more likely
than a federal court to preempt of state laws on the basis of CIL.
While the President is not constrained by the same political process constraints that scholars have relied upon to enforce principles
of federalism, the President is still politically accountable, at least
when compared to federal courts. Moreover, a review of historical
practice demonstrates that the President is often hesitant to undermine state autonomy in order to ensure compliance with international law, even where his constitutional authority seems undisputed.24 7 Not only have past presidents relied on state
governments to independently ensure compliance with international law, but recently, presidents have even permitted state governments to openly defy international law obligations out of deference to state autonomy and federalism (and perhaps political
calculation).24 8 For this reason, we doubt that injudicious executive
use of the power to preempt state laws by declarations of national
policy will occur very frequently or more frequently than it might
occur with federal courts holding this power.
CONCLUSION

Sosa represents the culmination of nearly 25 years of debate
over the status of CIL in U.S. courts. As we have explained, it
can be fairly read to endorse the majority view of international
legal scholars of the importance of preserving an independent
federal court role in the interpretation and enforcement of CIL.
Though Sosa recognized the force of the formalist critique, the
247See Ku, 82 NC L Rev at 495-97 (cited in note 235) (discussing executive's reluctance
to intervene into state activities that injure alien residents).
248 See id at 510-21 (discussing executive's reluctance to intervene in state criminal
punishment on the basis of international court judgments).
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Court was ultimately persuaded that the ATS litigation was necessarily a job for the federal courts. It refused to accept that "federal courts must avert their gaze from CIL" and that it was required by the formalist critique to remove "independent judicial
determination" of CIL.249
While we disagree with the Court's reading of the ATS, especially its unpersuasive attempt to marshal historical sources for
its conclusion, we believe that the real flaw in its decision lies in
a failure to seriously consider the functional difficulties of maintaining the existing system of ATS litigation. While scholars and
judges have widely celebrated the ATS as a mechanism for developing and enforcing international law and human rights, they
have not examined whether the federal courts are the most appropriate institution for achieving those goals.
Our main goal here has been to provide the functional analysis
that has generally been missing from the ATS debates. We conclude that the modern position's view of the ATS cannot be justified either as a reflection of congressional intent in the enactment
of the ATS or as a matter of superior institutional competence on
the part of federal courts. Federal courts suffer from many institutional shortcomings, especially when compared to the executive
branch, in achieving national goals in foreign relations.
We also believe that the Sosa Court may not have fully understood that there is a doctrinally sound and functionally superior
alternative system to the modern position. If federal courts are
divested of their jurisdiction over ATS litigation, CIL litigation
may still be entertained as part of the common law of the states.
We believe this system is superior to the existing one because
unlike current ATS litigation, the President has the independent
authority to preempt state law interpretations of CIL. Thus, the
executive branch would replace federal courts as the domestic institution responsible for developing, unifying, and interpreting
U.S. obligations under CIL. We hope that our discussion can shift
the terms of the ATS debate away from its largely inconclusive
battles over the historical origins of the statute to a more broadbased analysis of the consequences of the modern position and to
a deeper consideration of the possible alternatives.

249Sosa, 124 S Ct at 2764-65.

